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LAWMAKERS AS JOB BUYERS
By Edward W. De Barbieri*
In 2013, Washington State authorized the largest state tax incentive for
private industry in U.S. history. It is not remarkable for a state legislature
to use tax benefits to retain a major employer—in this case, the global
aerospace manufacturer Boeing. Laws across all states and thousands of
cities routinely incentivize companies such as Amazon to relocate or remain
in particular areas. Notably, however, Washington did not recover any of
the subsidies it authorized despite Boeing’s significant post-incentive
workforce reductions.
This story leads to several important questions: (1) How effective are state
and local legislatures at influencing business-location decisions?; (2) Do
such incentive programs actually achieve their goals of increasing and
maintaining jobs?; (3) Is the public protected from imprudent spending?
This Article looks specifically at the role of state and local governments in
encouraging businesses to locate in their jurisdictions. In such cases, state
and local lawmakers act as buyers of jobs.
This Article argues for a two-step proposal to limit subnational
government actions to incentivize business-location decisions. The first step
involves a bidding process where companies are awarded incentives based
on the lowest subsidy dollar amount required to create or retain a job of a
certain quality or pay rate. The second step involves defining job metrics
based on certain preconditions and recapturing incentives should a company
fail to maintain or achieve a defined number of job and qualities inherent in
each job. This two-step proposal has regulatory benefits and it mollifies the
political concern for jurisdictions to appear competitive and the need for
public financial protection.
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INTRODUCTION
In 2013, the Washington State legislature adopted the largest state tax
incentive program for private industry in U.S. history.1 The governor’s
office estimated that the almost $9 billion in tax incentives, in this case for
aerospace manufacturers, would yield $21 billion in economic activity.2
Only a few years after the incentives were adopted, however, Boeing, the
largest aerospace company in the world and the state’s largest employer,
reduced its workforce in the state by 17,466 workers.3
The governor and legislators from both political parties sought to compel
Boeing to return a portion of the tax incentives after the company reduced its
workforce.4 Yet, without statutory employment targets, lawmakers were
unable to claw back the subsidies.5 In the end, the legal process to incentivize
a company to remain and expand its workforce caused a significant loss in
employment to tens of thousands of families.6 Several years later, it is clear
1. In this instance, legislators in Washington State acted to keep a new plant set to
manufacture Boeing’s new aircraft, the 777X, from relocating outside the state. To do that,
Washington extended tax incentives, set to expire in 2024, through 2040. Specifically, the
legislature added the following text to state tax laws:
It is the legislature’s specific public policy objective to maintain and grow
Washington’s aerospace industry workforce. To help achieve this public policy
objective, it is the legislature’s intent to conditionally extend aerospace industry tax
preferences until July 1, 2040, in recognition of intent by the state’s aerospace
industry sector to maintain and grow its workforce within the state.
S. 5952, 63d Leg., 3d Spec. Sess. § 1(3) (Wash. 2013) (enacted). This subsidy program tops
the list of the largest state and local subsidy programs to private industrial company
developments, excluding sports stadiums and other major entertainment projects. PHILIP
MATTERA ET AL., GOOD JOBS FIRST, MEGADEALS: THE LARGEST ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
SUBSIDY PACKAGES EVER AWARDED BY STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS IN THE UNITED
STATES 6 (2013), www.goodjobsfirst.org/sites/default/files/docs/pdf/megadeals_report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/E244-9T6R].
2. The specific tax incentive program was valued at $8.7 billion and estimated to result
in $21 billion in economic activity over sixteen years. Andrew Garber, Legislature Approves
Tax Breaks to Secure Boeing 777X, SEATTLE TIMES (Nov. 9, 2013, 7:04 PM),
https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/legislature-approves-tax-breaks-to-secureboeing-777x/ [https://perma.cc/9PBK-U2GD]. The political reality underlying the incentive
extension is clear: as one strategist put it, “governors [who] deliver Boeing jobs win
reelection. Period.” Reid Wilson, Boeing Machinists Agree to 777X Contract on Narrow Vote,
WASH. POST (Jan. 4, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/govbeat/wp/2014/01/04/
boeing-machinists-agree-to-777x-contract-on-narrow-vote/ [https://perma.cc/33UJ-YW36].
3. Boeing now reports 17,466 fewer workers in Washington State from a high of 83,295
when the tax plan was approved to 65,829 in 2018. See General Information: Employment
Data, BOEING, https://www.boeing.com/company/general-info/index.page#/employmentdata [https://perma.cc/G744-AHW6] (last visited Aug. 22, 2019); Alwyn Scott, Washington
Lawmakers Nix Bill Linking Tax Breaks to Boeing Jobs, REUTERS (Feb. 5, 2016, 4:55 PM),
https://reut.rs/2OxdrG1 [https://perma.cc/C6N4-64WX].
4. The bill’s original text only allowed Washington State to recapture the incentives “[i]f
a significant commercial airplane manufacturing program is not sited in the state of
Washington . . . .” See Wash. S. 5952 § 2(1).
5. Reductions in total workforce or jobs numbers were not considered in the bill
language. See id.
6. The unfortunate reality is that the Boeing 777X plant was built but the labor will
largely be robotic. Dominic Gates, At Boeing’s 777X Wing Factory, Robots Get Big Jobs,
SEATTLE TIMES (Nov. 26, 2016, 6:00 AM), https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-
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that the bill failed as measured against the incentive package’s stated intent
to “maintain and grow jobs in the aerospace industry in Washington state.”7
This vignette is but one instance of state lawmakers using tax incentives
to attempt to buy jobs.8 Amazon’s public competition to locate its second
headquarters and its decision to pull out of a proposed location in New York
City9 are widely reported examples of this frequent phenomenon. Often,
efforts to create new jobs result in relocating jobs from a neighboring state
or defensive spending to prevent interstate job competition.10 Current
estimates of state and local business incentive spending range up to
$80.4 billion per year.11 One dataset lists almost 400 commercial and
industrial real estate projects that each received over $50 million in state or
local subsidies since approximately 1980.12 State and local government debt
has ballooned alongside this increased spending. Excluding employee
retirement funds, state and local government debt has swollen from $21
billion in 1950 to over $3 trillion today.13
Two common tools used by state and local government to spur economic
development activity are job-creation tax credits and property tax
abatements.14 Governments use these tools, along with bond issuances and
even local land-use approvals, to induce companies to create jobs and invest

aerospace/at-boeings-777x-wing-factory-robots-get-big-jobs/
[https://perma.cc/WAD8P6YF].
7. See Wash. S. 5952 pmbl.; see also General Information: Employment Data, supra
note 3; Scott, supra note 3.
8. The federal government is largely agnostic about state and local government subsidies
to private companies competing with companies from neighboring states. State ex rel. Ohio
Cty. Comm’n v. Samol, 275 S.E.2d 2, 5 (W. Va. 1980) (Neely, C.J., concurring) (discussing
existing federal tax law as “an invitation to states to subsidize their own citizens competing
with the citizens of other states”). Commentators have observed that such subsidy programs
amount to elected officials buying jobs. Editorial, Amazon’s Golden Fleecing, WALL ST. J.
(Nov. 14, 2018, 6:33 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/amazons-golden-fleecing1542230916 [https://perma.cc/5YU4-YDUR] (“The worst actors here are the politicians who
pose as job creators but are essentially job buyers.”).
9. J. David Goodman, Amazon Pulls Out of Planned New York City Headquarters, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 14, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/14/nyregion/amazon-hq2queens.html [https://perma.cc/3ZKE-ZKDY].
10. Episode 699: Why Did the Job Cross the Road?, NPR: PLANET MONEY (May 4, 2016,
10:42 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/money/2016/05/04/476799218/episode-699-whydid-the-job-cross-the-road [https://perma.cc/9ZBC-RANY] (investigating the phenomenon of
cross border job poaching in Kansas City, Missouri and Kansas City, Kansas).
11. Louise Story et al., Explore the Data, N.Y. TIMES (2016),
http://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/interactive/2012/12/01/us/governmentincentives.html#home [https://perma.cc/A8ZA-ZQ8R].
12. See generally MATTERA ET AL., supra note 1.
13. State and Local Governments, Excluding Retirement Funds; Debt Securities and
Loans;
Liability,
Level,
FRED,
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/SLGSDODNS
[https://perma.cc/Z4U6-Y2J6] (last updated June 6, 2019).
14. TIMOTHY J. BARTIK, W. E. UPJOHN INST. FOR EMP’T RESEARCH, A NEW PANEL
DATABASE ON BUSINESS INCENTIVES FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OFFERED BY STATE AND
LOCAL GOVERNMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES 1 (2017).
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capital.15 Job creation and capital investment through building construction
and equipment installation grow state and local government tax bases.16
The political benefits to providing major employers with financial
subsidies are clear.17 Elected officials act within their authority to halt job
losses when faced with a plant closure and the prospect of constituents losing
their employment.18 Similarly, to appear competitive, elected officials enact
legislation to lure new jobs by attracting businesses to grow or diversify a
state’s economy.19 Both Texas and Florida, for example, authorize their
governors to close deals with companies seeking to relocate to another
state.20 Politically, these programs shield legislators when a group of
workers faces job cuts or a community lobbies to incentivize an employer to
relocate from outside the state.21
Economic development activity by state and local government has serious
risks. Governments risk bankruptcy should incentives become too costly. In
a recent example, incentives to automakers in Michigan brought about a
significant state fiscal crisis.22 In other cases, governments may be
financially liable if a development deal falls through. New York State spent
massive amounts of public money through its failed Empire Zone Program
for projects that were either never built or did little, if anything, to grow the

15. See infra Part I.A.
16. C. Tyler Mulligan, Economic Development Incentives and North Carolina Local
Governments: A Framework for Analysis, 91 N.C. L. REV. 2021, 2024 (2013) (discussing
local government cash grants to private companies to grow tax base).
17. For an excellent discussion about how those companies and individuals with political
power benefit their own financial interests, see BRINK LINDSEY & STEVEN M. TELES, THE
CAPTURED ECONOMY: HOW THE POWERFUL ENRICH THEMSELVES, SLOW DOWN GROWTH, AND
INCREASE INEQUALITY 12–13, 28–31, 153 (2017) (“[P]olitical power consists of the ability to
win distributional struggles over fixed resources.”).
18. See, e.g., Wilson, supra note 2 (regarding Governor Jay Inslee’s apparent political
calculation to keep Boeing jobs in Washington State as a means of ensuring constituent
support).
19. For example, 238 cities pitched proposals to attract Amazon’s second headquarters,
each with their own local incentives to appear competitive. Amazon News (@amazonnews),
TWITTER (Oct. 23, 2017, 7:41 AM), https://twitter.com/amazonnews/status/
922473078805762048 [https://perma.cc/6G4Z-QUEY].
20. The Texas Legislature created the Texas Enterprise Fund to allow the governor to
negotiate directly with businesses on awarding job-creation tax credits. The law requires an
award agreement that includes the number of jobs that will be created and a deadline for the
creation of the jobs. It also requires repayment if the jobs are not created by the appropriate
deadline. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 481.078 (West 2019). Florida’s Quick Action Closing
Fund is similar. However, the bill’s text includes criteria for making an award. Specifically,
the economic benefit must be 5:1 (five dollars of benefit for every dollar of incentive) and jobs
must pay at least 125 percent of the average private sector wage in the state or area. FLA. STAT.
§ 288.1088 (2018).
21. Legislatures are politically insulated because, at least in these two states, it is the
governor’s office that bears responsibility should a particular deal fall through.
22. Michigan was forced to negotiate a cap on tax incentives with the “Big Three”
automakers following a strain on the state’s $10 billion general fund and a $325 million
midyear budget cut. See Chad Livengood et al., Value of GM’s State Tax Credits Remain
Secret, DET. NEWS (Dec. 15, 2015, 10:19 AM), https://www.detroitnews.com/story/news/
politics/2015/12/15/general-motors-mega/77352724/ [https://perma.cc/6PW4-UPV8].
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economy.23 In 2009, St. Louis, Missouri transferred building rights for 1500
acres of land to one developer for a project expected to develop the tax base.
But thus far it has only has resulted in a single gas station and grocery store.24
Areas that devote significant public resources to business location
incentives often struggle with other public investments such as school
funding.25 Michigan, while a leader in public spending for business location
incentives, lags in school-spending growth.26 Predominantly African
American school districts such as those in Detroit and Flint suffer from
conscious decision-making that separates opportunity based on geography.27
Legal constraints originally emerged to protect the public and governments
against the catastrophes associated with economic development activity gone
awry. The public purpose doctrine—the principle that public funds should
not go to private parties without a public purpose—emerged in the mid-1800s
following public investments in speculative railroad construction.28 Around
23. Tim Knauss, Empire Zones, NY’s Failed Aid to Companies, Still Costing Taxpayers:
$3 Billion Plus, SYRACUSE.COM (Aug. 9, 2017, 10:13 AM), https://www.syracuse.com/
state/index.ssf/2017/08/empire_zones_nys_failed_aid_to_companies_keep_costing_taxpayer
s_3_billion_plus.html [https://perma.cc/P48P-8TUN] (“I’ve never done a study on Empire
Zones . . . . I would say the empirical evidence . . . suggests that what we were doing, we
should not be doing,” said the current head of New York State’s economic development
agency.).
24. Jacob Barker, St. Louis Wants to Cut Ties with Northside Developer Paul McKee, ST.
LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (June 13, 2018), https://www.stltoday.com/business/local/st-louiswants-to-cut-ties-with-northside-developer-paul/article_88ba714f-10be-5665-be8ae3df35f5e341.html [https://perma.cc/2CSG-7A3C]; David Nicklaus, With Northside Stalled,
It’s Time to Rethink City’s Development Approach, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (July 1, 2018),
https://www.stltoday.com/business/columns/david-nicklaus/with-northside-stalled-it-s-timeto-rethink-city-s/article_51c04811-0979-58da-9586-e5c82fd674a1.html
[https://perma.cc/6T7Z-GNVZ].
25. Michigan, for instance, ranked last among states in total education revenue growth
from 1995 to 2015. DAVID ARSEN ET AL., MICHIGAN SCHOOL FINANCE AT THE CROSSROADS:
A QUARTER CENTURY OF STATE CONTROL 1, 7 (2019), http://education.msu.edu/ed-policyphd/pdf/Michigan-School-Finance-at-the-Crossroads-A-Quarter-Center-of-State-Control.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6VSN-AN8M].
26. Id. at 1.
27. RICHARD SCHRAGGER, CITY POWER: URBAN GOVERNANCE IN A GLOBAL AGE 243
(2016).
28. The legal academic scholarship on the public purpose doctrine begins with a focus on
government’s inability to levy taxes but for public purposes. Francis W. Bird, The Evolution
of Due Process of Law in the Decisions of the United States Supreme Court, 13 COLUM. L.
REV. 37, 43 (1913) (“[T]he fundamental law restrains a state legislature from authorizing the
issuance of bonds in aid of a private purpose.”); Breck P. McAllister, Public Purpose in
Taxation, 18 CALIF. L. REV. 137, 137 (1930) (“It was to curb governmental expenditures that
the doctrine of public purpose was first used in state court . . . .”); Howard Lee McBain,
Taxation for a Private Purpose, 29 POL. SCI. Q. 185, 185 (1914) (discussing the maxim that
public authorities may not levy taxes for private purposes). More recently, scholarship has
focused on the expanding importance of subsidizing economic development by government.
See generally Martin E. Gold, Economic Development Projects: A Perspective, 19 URB. LAW.
193 (1987) (discussing different state and local governments’ economic development projects
and the legal constraints they face, most notably from the public purpose doctrine and state
constitutional prohibitions); Martin E. Gold & Lynne B. Sagalyn, The Use and Abuse of Blight
in Eminent Domain, 38 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1119 (2011) (focusing on the role of “blight” in
state and local government condemning property through eminent domain for economic
development purposes after Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005)).
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that time, many states and the U.S. Supreme Court drastically limited stateand local-government wealth redistribution to private companies both
through public purpose doctrine litigation and state constitutional
amendments prohibiting such actions.29
Today, state- and city-government spending on economic development
activity is enormous.30 Courts barely constrain payments for such
programs.31 One recent study of litigation brought between 1994 and 2014
indicates that, in almost all cases, courts would not limit government outlays
based on public purpose claims or related state constitutional prohibitions.32
Scholars who have studied government support for private economic
development activity have proposed reforms. Substantive proposals have
ranged from a focus on how projects impact communities33 to compelling
courts to use agency law instead of contract law principles in evaluating
public purpose cases.34 Scholars have suggested procedural reforms too.
One procedural proposal would give state attorneys general more oversight
over investigating subsidy programs.35 Another procedural proposal argues
for only allocating public funds for economic development activities through
nonprofit corporations.36
29. State and local spending was never banned completely. For instance, a leading mid1800s case held that public support for private railroads could serve a public purpose.
Sharpless v. Mayor of Phila., 21 Pa. 147, 169 (1853) (“A railroad is a public highway for the
public benefit . . . .”). Other aid schemes to private companies were less favored by courts.
The first U.S. Supreme Court case to discuss the public purpose requirement in the
government’s economic development activities was decided in 1874. See generally Loan
Ass’n v. Topeka, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 655 (1874) (holding that a city bond to be paid to a private
ironworks company for bridge building was an illegal payment to a private corporation).
30. See Story et al., supra note 11. There is no single definition of the term “city.” It is
used interchangeably throughout this Article with the term “local” to encompass substate
government, including, for instance, county, city, town, or other political subdivision.
31. Richard Briffault, The Disfavored Constitution: State Fiscal Limits and State
Constitutional Law, 34 RUTGERS L.J. 907, 945 (2003) (“[T]he public purpose requirement as
a constraint on legislative action is a dead letter today.”).
32. See generally Brian Libgober, The Death of Public Purpose (and How to Prevent It)
(Harvard Univ. John M. Olin Ctr. for Law, Econ. & Bus., Discussion Paper No. 63, 2016),
http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin_center/fellows_papers/pdf/Libgober_63.pdf
[https://perma.cc/T7PS-BUMN] (discussing a correlation, though not causation, between the
decrease in the filing of public purpose doctrine cases and an increase in state and local
government debt).
33. Comment, The “Public Purpose” of Municipal Financing for Industrial Development,
70 YALE L.J. 789, 802 (1961) (arguing that courts ought to consider safety precautions, plans
for disposal of industrial waste, transportation congestion, impact on public services, housing,
and psychological tensions when considering the effects of a government financed industrial
facility). “The argument for finding a public purpose becomes weaker if, for example, no
provisions have been made for increased traffic, housing needs, sewerage disposal or health
requirements.” Id.
34. See Libgober, supra note 32, at 5.
35. See, e.g., Daniel J. Munoz, AG to Probe $11 Billion in NJ Tax Breaks, NJBIZ (Jan.
14, 2019, 3:57 PM), https://njbiz.com/ag-to-probe-11-billion-in-nj-tax-breaks/ [https://
perma.cc/CP5K-S848] (describing a recent example of the attorney general’s investigation of
state economic development subsidies).
36. See Dale F. Rubin, The Public Pays, The Corporation Profits: The Emasculation of
the Public Purpose Doctrine and a Not-for-Profit Solution, 28 U. RICH. L. REV. 1311, 1313
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Against all of this background rests the theory behind how subnational
governments interact with, and encourage, private business investment.37
While often overlooked, states and cities play important administrative and
regulatory functions in shaping business-location decisions.38 A significant
critique, however, is that governmental incentives to influence private
business location selection are much more specious than most anticipate.39
The simplest and most elegant solution to constraining subnational
economic development spending is to limit such spending only to the types
of public-works projects that are traditionally the sole realm of state and local
government.40 Such a limitation, however, is unlikely to be acceptable given
that economic development spending is currently viewed permissively.41 An
intermediate step that both protects the public fisc and allows states and cities
to spend money on economic development is a process with both procedural
and substantive checks.
First, states and cities ought to consider a reverse auction approach to
rationalize the subsidy-allocation process.42 A reverse auction allows a seller
to sell a predetermined amount of goods or services for the lowest price
buyers are willing to pay for everything on sale. For example, Google used

(1994) (“[A]n examination of the historical development of the Public Purpose Doctrine
establishes that the proliferation of . . . public subsidies . . . is unconstitutional.”).
37. See, e.g., Timothy J. Bartik, Business Location Decisions in the United States:
Estimates of the Effects of Unionization, Taxes, and Other Characteristics of States, 3 J. BUS.
& ECON. STAT. 14, 14–21 (1985).
38. See Richard C. Schragger, Mobile Capital, Local Economic Regulation, and the
Democratic City, 123 HARV. L. REV. 482, 484 (2009) (“[C]ities have recently engaged in a
flurry of efforts to redistribute capital, place conditions on it, or limit its entry.”).
39. SCHRAGGER, supra note 27, at 2 (“But how much of a city’s economic health is or can
be attributed to the decisions made by city leaders is quite uncertain.”); Richard C. Schragger,
Rethinking the Theory and Practice of Local Economic Development, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 311,
313 (2009) (“[W]e do not have a consensus account of how cities form, develop, and grow or
decline. Thus, any claim that one policy or another will generate local economic growth
should be made with a great deal of skepticism.”).
40. Public works include infrastructure, such as roads, bridges, water and sewer facilities,
and the like.
41. See Gold & Sagalyn, supra note 28, at 159. Courts have long deferred to legislatures
in interpreting the meaning of a public purpose. Kalkowski v. Neb. Nat’l Trails Museum
Found., Inc., 826 N.W.2d 589, 598 (Neb. Ct. App. 2013) (“[I]t is for the Legislature to decide
in the first instance what is and what is not a public purpose, for the purposes of expenditure
of public funds . . . .”). Encouraging economic and industrial growth through indirect
activities like marketing and advertising expenditures is a public purpose. Id.
42. The government uses auctions to sell goods or services that it otherwise would need
to set a price for. See ERIC A. POSNER & E. GLEN WEYL, RADICAL MARKETS: UPROOTING
CAPITALISM AND DEMOCRACY FOR A JUST SOCIETY 50 (2018). Online advertising providers,
like Google’s AdSense, use auctions to determine what ads will appear to a given user. About
the Ad Auction, GOOGLE: ADSENSE HELP, https://support.google.com/adsense/answer/
160525?hl=en [https://perma.cc/J3TE-ATBM] (last visited Aug. 22, 2019). Online reverse
auctions are commonplace in industrial procurement both for government and most major
industries. Sandy D. Jap, The Impact of Online Reverse Auction Design on Buyer-Supplier
Relationships, 71 J. MARKETING, Jan. 2007, at 146, 146. Jap notes the importance of buyers
in designing reverse auctions to maintain relationships with suppliers. Id.
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a reverse auction in its initial public stock offering.43 The initial price for a
single share was set at the lowest price that all shares would be sold following
a bidding process.44 Frequent flyers on commercial airlines are familiar with
efforts to engage passengers on an oversold flight to fly at a later date in
exchange for vouchers towards future travel using a reverse auction.45
Here, the reverse auction process is similar. State or local government
economic development agencies would announce a reverse auction proposal
process.46 Private employers are invited to bid on public incentives, such as
job-creation tax credits. Employers bid on the dollar amount of job-creation
tax credits that they would require to create full-time, or full-timeequivalent,47 positions. The reviewing economic development agency would
consult the bid list and award subsidies for the lowest amount of subsidy-perjob created until all of the budgeted subsidy funds are spent. Agencies could
consider additional metrics, such as industry sector, amount of compensation
per employee, and a residency requirement for the employees.
Second, recapture mechanisms linked to specific job numbers (retained or
created) ought to be included in the contracts awarded through the bid
process. This way, governments can precondition the release of funds based
on specific, targeted, and predetermined metrics, and they can claw back
funds spent on companies that accept subsidies but let workers go anyway.
Governmental subsidy administrators may use clawback provisions to deter
company flight based on particular community economic needs.48
There are potential benefits to involving state and local government in the
economic development process using these two steps. Beyond ensuring
public law norms, like openness, transparency, and accountability, the
“publicization” of economic development activity allows for subnational
governments to effect policy priorities. States and cities already exert
regulatory control when contracting for construction services, by, for
43. Ann E. Sherman, Global Trends in IPO Methods: Book Building Versus Auctions
with Endogenous Entry, 78 J. FIN. ECON. 615, 616 (2005).
44. Id. at 629–30.
45. The Hub Team, Introducing New Customer Options for Flexible Travel Plans, UNITED
(Nov.
7,
2017),
https://hub.united.com/united-new-customer-travel-options2507483285.html [https://perma.cc/4CHM-LXLX].
46. Government purchasing is typically regulated by state procurement laws. See, e.g.,
N.Y. STATE FIN. LAW § 163 (McKinney 2019). Such laws often detail how bidding shall occur
and under what circumstances—such as in a state of emergency, when such bidding processes
may be suspended.
47. Individual agencies have the flexibility to craft their specific programs to reflect either
full-time positions or several part-time positions combined to equal a full-time equivalency.
48. A recent academic work in political science and economics also suggests clawing back
business location incentives for noncompliance as at least part of the solution to curbing abuse
in such incentives. NATHAN M. JENSEN & EDMUND J. MALESKY, INCENTIVES TO PANDER: HOW
POLITICIANS USE CORPORATE WELFARE FOR POLITICAL GAIN 201 (2018) (“Clawbacks can thus
police fraud or legitimate poor performance of investments, but they do not address that many
incentive dollars are duplicative, wasted on firms that would have come anyway.”). Currently,
community benefit agreements and other regulatory tools allow communities or governments
to negotiate and contract for such specific economic benefit terms with private companies.
See, e.g., Edward W. De Barbieri, Do Community Benefits Agreements Benefit Communities?,
37 CARDOZO L. REV. 1773, 1776 (2016).
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example, requiring a percentage of companies to be owned by women, racial
groups traditionally excluded from business ownership, or disabled
veterans.49
State agency bidding for economic development is not uncommon. Tax
credits to spur the creation of affordable housing—low-income housing tax
credits (LIHTCs)—are issued by state agencies through an allocation process
that is a form of bidding.50 State housing agencies develop Qualified
Allocation Plans to distribute LIHTCs.51 The LIHTC program itself is facing
a crisis since private developers created over 80 percent of affordable housing
units—units which will revert to private ownership following the expiration
of the tax credits and possibly lead to increased evictions for low-income
renters.52
A two-step reverse auction and clawback proposal could permit small
employers to band together and make collective proposals for jobs and
commercial real estate subsidies. Typically excluded from the largest
subsidy projects, many small, start-up businesses are kept out of the
economic development subsidy market. The proposed two-step approach
invites smaller firms to work together to grow and collectively hire more
workers.53
This Article starts out by analyzing the ways in which state and local
officials use law to act as job buyers, often to the detriment of the public.
Part I begins by discussing current legal tools available to states and cities to
subsidize economic development. Next, Part I discusses competition and
other political arguments advanced to support public wealth redistribution to
private companies. Finally, this Part addresses the fiscal risks of
unconstrained economic development spending. Part II then discusses
current doctrinal and constitutional constraints on economic development
spending, the ineffectiveness of the same, and existing scholarly substantive
and procedural suggestions to constrain such spending.
This Article then analyzes avenues for legislatures and courts to constrain
redistribution of public funds to private companies. Part III introduces two
primary steps that elected officials should consider—and the judiciary ought
to focus on—in reviewing such activities. The first step involves
encouraging the use of reverse auctions to ensure that states and cities use the
49. See, e.g., N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 313 (McKinney 2019).
50. Brandon M. Weiss, Locating Affordable Housing, 70 HASTINGS L.J. 215, 221 (2018).
51. I.R.C. § 42(m)(1)(A)(i) (2012) (“[S]uch amount was allocated pursuant to a qualified
allocation plan of the housing credit agency which is approved by the governmental unit . . .
of which such agency is a part.”).
52. Brandon M. Weiss, Residual Value Capture in Subsidized Housing, 10 HARV. L. &
POL’Y REV. 521, 545 (2016).
53. While the two-step approach described here is novel, state and local governmental
support for small firm job buying is not. New York State, for instance, replaced its failed
Empire Zone program, see infra note 120, with a program designed specifically to incubate
start-ups. New York State Certified Business Incubators and Innovation Hot Spots, N.Y. ST.:
EMPIRE ST. DEV., https://esd.ny.gov/certified-business-incubator [https://perma.cc/7TBJT7L2] (last visited Aug. 22, 2019). The author directs a pro bono legal services program that
partners with one of these incubators.
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least amount of subsidy possible when buying jobs. The second step involves
substantive analysis to ensure that laws provide clawback mechanisms tied
to the actual number of jobs created or retained. Part IV applies the two-step
proposal to existing programs used in Washington, Texas, and Florida.
The relationship between subnational governments and private businesses
should be reassessed. Legal scholars ought to be skeptical of such
governments setting industrial policy.54 Because economic development
programs do not appear to be going anywhere anytime soon, in the interim,
alternatives to the status quo should be considered.
States and cities should have companies bid for subsidies.55 A bidding
process with definable job goals ensures that proposed economic
development activity best meets the public purpose as outlined by the
legislature, interpreted by the agency reviewing the bids, and, ultimately,
reviewed by the courts.56 The two-step reverse auction and clawback
proposal argued for here is simpler, easier, and results in a more efficient
redistribution of scarce public funds for needed economic development.57
I. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT LAW: SUBSIDY TOOLS AND RISKS
A. Taxes, Bonds, and Local Land Use
To create an effective reverse-auction and recapture process for economic
development subsidies, governments must change their current method of
financing job-buying. There are a number of tools available to states and
cities to engage in economic development activity. These tools largely
involve authorization via state legislation.58 Taxation and bond issuances are
the most common tools for revenue generation.59 At the local level, land-use
54. For a broader discussion about scholarly skepticism of cities setting industrial policy,
see generally SCHRAGGER, supra note 27.
55. There have been other market-based proposals in the realm of urban economic
development. See, e.g., Michael Heller & Rick Hills, Land Assembly Districts, 121 HARV. L.
REV. 1465, 1468 (2008) (proposing a legal system for owners in a neighborhood to collectively
decide whether the land should be assembled for development into a larger parcel).
56. By analogy, this process would work similarly to the way that projects are reviewed
for environmental impact. The state or local government follows development guidelines in
an environmental impact statement. Public hearings occur and written comments are
accepted. As long as the state or local government agency follows the guidelines, a court will
likely uphold the environmental impact statement process. See generally Ordonez v. City of
New York, No. 450100/2018, 2018 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 3002 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. July 11, 2018).
57. An empirical proposal of this sort is not alone in its effort to reform an otherwise
wasteful political process. Scholars have argued that court analysis of gerrymandering cases
would benefit from an efficiency gap analysis where courts look to see how many votes for
either political party are wasted in a given district. See, e.g., Nicolas O. Stephanopoulos &
Eric M. McGhee, Partisan Gerrymandering and the Efficiency Gap, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 831,
834 (2015).
58. S. 5952, 63d Leg., 3d Spec. Sess. § 1 (Wash. 2013) (enacted); Gold, supra note 28, at
207.
59. Richard Briffault has pointed out how state constitutions contain the primary fiscal
constraints for state and local governments. Briffault, supra note 31, at 908 (“[S]tate
constitutions accord extensive consideration to state and local spending, borrowing, and
taxing.”).
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approvals are common to induce companies to relocate, remain, and expand
operations in specific communities. Governments can spend by doing
everything from the direct purchase of private corporation shares60 to the
construction of commercial property, which then gets leased to private
interests.61
1. Taxation: Tax Exemption, Job-Creation Tax Credits, and Property Tax
Abatements
States and cities frequently grant tax exemptions to spur private economic
development. As discussed above, in 2013, the Washington State legislature
extended aerospace tax preferences and expanded exemption of sales and use
taxes for new plants manufacturing aerospace-related products.62 The tax
exemption was extended specifically on the condition that Boeing build a
new manufacturing line—though not necessarily hire or retain a certain
number of workers.63
Job-creation tax credits, on the other hand, are tax benefits directly
connected to creating jobs and increasing payroll.64 New York State’s jobs
tax credit program, called the Excelsior Jobs Program, conditions the
issuance of credits based on the amount of funds companies plan to invest,
as well as the particular type of industry in which the company operates.65
Amazon was expected to receive $1.2 billion in Excelsior Jobs Program tax
credits for its new headquarters in Long Island City, New York.66
Cities frequently exempt local property taxes to encourage business
relocation and commercial real estate development.67 The Excelsior Jobs
60. See Sharpless v. Mayor of Phila., 21 Pa. 147, 173, 175 (1853) (upholding the purchase
by a city of shares in a railroad corporation).
61. Briffault, supra note 31, at 919–20 (“[S]tate or local government enters into an
arrangement with a private firm or public authority bond issuer to lease the bond-financed
facility for a period of time, with the government’s lease payments covering the annual debt
service.”).
62. See Wash. S. 5952 § 1. The legislative findings of such an act of the legislature will
prove important. Here, the legislature found, for example, “that the people of Washington
have benefited enormously from the presence of the aerospace industry in Washington state.
The legislature further finds that the industry continues to provide good wages and benefits
for the thousands of engineers, mechanics, and support staff working directly in the industry
throughout the state.” Id.
63. See id.
64. See generally BARTIK, supra note 14.
65. Scientific research and development, software development, and financial services are
some of the strategic industries, but so are agriculture, manufacturing, and distribution.
Excelsior Jobs Program, N.Y. ST.:
EMPIRE ST. DEV., https://cdn.esd.ny.gov/
businessprograms/data/excelsior/excelsiorjobsprogramoverview.pdf [https://perma.cc/A24DL886] (last visited Aug. 22, 2019).
66. Letter from Howard Zemsky, President & Chief Exec. Officer, Empire State Dev., to
Holly Sullivan, Head of WW Econ. Dev., Amazon.com Servs., Inc. (Nov. 12, 2018),
https://d39w7f4ix9f5s9.cloudfront.net/4d/db/a54a9d6c4312bb171598d0b2134c/new-yorkagreement.pdf [https://perma.cc/JRE2-2ML9].
67. Two examples in New York City from 2013 involved the Hudson Yards development
on Manhattan’s West Side and the Willets Point development in Queens. Hudson Yards,
Willets Point Receive Tax Breaks, CRAIN’S N.Y. BUS. (Dec. 9, 2013, 11:00 PM),
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Program, for instance, includes funds for local property tax exemptions in
addition to jobs tax credits.68 Property tax exemptions often accompany
discretionary land use approvals, which are addressed in greater detail below.
Of note here, none of the types of exemptions mentioned above are auctioned
off.69 Instead, they are generally used to influence company location
decisions. The exemption programs are the result of specific legislation
authorized by state or local legislatures.
2. Bonding: General Obligation Bonds, Revenue Bonds, and Private
Activity Bonds
States and cities authorize the issuance of bonds to fund development and
support activities like private economic development.70 The Internal
Revenue Code (the “Code”) classifies state- and local-government bonds as
either governmental bonds or private activity bonds.71 Generally, private
activity bonds are not tax-exempt, like governmental bonds are, unless the
activities funded are qualified private activities.72 Today, the major qualified
private activities funded by private activity bonds are facilities built by
hospitals, universities, and other private corporations.73
The subsidization of private companies includes instances where the state
or city government builds a facility and then leases it to a private business.
The private business pays rent, taking advantage of the lower interest rate
that the government may obtain based on the tax-exempt nature of the bond.
In some cases, the lease can be structured as a lease-to-own—whereby the
company owns the property after making lease payments for a certain number
of years.74

https://www.crainsnewyork.com/article/20131210/REAL_ESTATE/131219984/hudsonyards-willets-point-receive-tax-breaks [https://perma.cc/CY33-53P6].
68. See, e.g., Excelsior Jobs Program, supra note 65.
69. See id. at 3 (describing the application process, which does not discuss an auction
process—rather, applicants complete funding applications that may, if approved, lead to
certificates allowing selected applicants to claim tax credits).
70. Borrowing is typically subject to allowable debt limits. For an in-depth, critical
analysis of how states and local governments limit their borrowing, see generally Nadav
Shoked, Debt Limits’ End, 102 IOWA L. REV. 1239 (2017).
71. See I.R.C § 103 (2012). From a terminology perspective, “private activity bonds”
were formerly known as “industrial development bonds”—a change that has created some
problems. ROBERT S. AMDURSKY ET AL., MUNICIPAL DEBT FINANCE LAW: THEORY AND
PRACTICE 498 (2d ed. 2013).
72. See I.R.C. § 141 (2012). In 1968, Congress continued the exemption of interest earned
on “industrial development bonds” but set limits on the amount and purpose. ROBERT A.
FIPPINGER, THE SECURITIES LAW OF PUBLIC FINANCE 47 (2d ed. 1998).
73. Martin Z. Braun & Sahil Kapur, Congress’s Tax Bill Keeps Subsidies for Private
Activity Bonds, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 15, 2017, 5:15 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/
articles/2017-12-15/congress-s-tax-bill-keeps-subsidies-for-private-activity-bonds
[https://perma.cc/H6UE-552V].
74. See, e.g., Bd. of Dirs. of Indus. Dev. Bd. v. All Taxpayers, 938 So. 2d 11, 26 (La.
2006).
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While the Code sets caps on the amount of nonexempt private activity
bonds,75 leaseback or lease-and-sale arrangements allow governments to
avoid the strict caps. Some argue that states and cities are smart to engage in
creative transactions that permit support for private businesses when such
activity would otherwise be prevented.76 Courts struggle to set the outer
limits of industrial support by subnational government.77 While auctions are
common tools for subnational governments to use in the disposition of
property, they are not commonly used to influence business-location
decisions.
Some state finance laws limit local government from taking on debt that
exceeds the useful life of a capital project.78 Robert S. Amdursky, Clayton
P. Gillette, and G. Allen Bass point out that the effect of such regimes is
twofold: first, it allows the municipality to require future users to pay their
share of the costs of a capital project; second, it limits the ability of a current
generation to require a future generation to pay for a project from which it
derives no benefit.79
3. Auctions and Local Land Use
Local land use law mechanisms are additional economic development
tools available to local governments to incentivize private economic
development.80
Currently, market-based principles of bidding and
auctioning exist within the realm of local land use law. Examples of such
market-based tools include tax increment financing districts, transferrable
development rights, and even requests for development proposals, among
others.
When county or city governments issue tax-exempt development bonds to
condemn and improve land for a new manufacturing facility or corporate
headquarters, they need a stream of revenue to pay off the bonds. In many
cases, this is accomplished using the additional property tax revenue earned
once the development sites are improved.81 Known as tax-increment
financing, the process, which dates back to California in 1952, begins with
the city council approving a special tax-increment district and a project
75. STEVEN MAGUIRE & JOSEPH S. HUGHES, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL31457, PRIVATE
ACTIVITY BONDS: AN INTRODUCTION 17 (2018).
76. See, e.g., Tom Tew, Industrial Bond Financing and the Florida Public Purpose
Doctrine, 21 U. MIAMI L. REV. 171, 194 (1966).
77. See generally Comment, supra note 33.
78. See AMDURSKY ET AL., supra note 71, at 12 (citing N.Y. LOCAL FIN. LAW § 11.00
(McKinney 1988 Supp.)).
79. Id.
80. The focus of this background section is on state and local subsidization tools.
Additional subsidy tools exist at the federal level. Environmental Protection Agency waivers,
for instance, provide additional subsidies to industry to encourage investments in new
factories. A recent example is the Foxconn deal in Wisconsin. See Michael Hawthorne, EPA
Chief Pruitt Overrules Staff, Gives Wisconsin’s Walker, Foxconn Big Break on Smog, CHI.
TRIB. (May 2, 2018, 6:49 AM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/breaking/ct-metsmog-pruitt-foxconn-20180501-story.html [https://perma.cc/FY59-8XJG].
81. Jerry Frug, The Geography of Community, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1047, 1087 (1996).
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plan.82 Following the plan’s adoption, the tax base of the special district is
frozen—any additional revenue is directed to pay off the bonds issued to fund
the development.83
The otherwise logical nature of tax-increment financing plans belies their
occasional controversial nuances. One botched tax-increment financing
project in St. Louis, for instance, placed a plan to redevelop 1500 acres of
urban land in limbo. Disagreement over the project has led the city and the
developer, as well as the Missouri Attorney General, to court.84 It is not
unsurprising that tax-increment financing schemes can be politically
controversial. The political economy of urban areas is often a source of
political contention.
Other market-based mechanisms for auction-like bidding include
transferable development rights and city issuances of requests for proposals.
Transferrable development rights have been used in dense urban areas like
Importantly, the transfer of
New York City’s Theater District.85
development rights—the ability to take buildable air rights from one property
and transfer them to another—has always been seen as a strictly private
market.86 A private market for transferrable development rights is certainly
a kindred spirit to an auction for job-creation subsidies; once a government
creates the program, transferrable development rights are exchanged in a
purely private market without government intervention.
Over recent decades, cities holding large portfolios of vacant properties
have turned to selling vacant land to mostly real estate speculators through
auctions.87 In New York City, government officials rarely place any
conditions on auctions, which has led landowners to leave land vacant and
community groups to oppose the auction process.88
Aside from auctions, cities transfer property through open requests for
proposals (the “RFP” process). A recent RFP for a mixed-use commercial
real estate project in Denver describes two properties that the city purchased
82. See BERNARD J. FRIEDEN & LYNNE B. SAGALYN, DOWNTOWN, INC.: HOW AMERICA
REBUILDS CITIES 97 (1989) (discussing the history and process of tax-increment financing
processes and planning).
83. Id.
84. See generally Smith v. City of St. Louis, 395 S.W.3d 20 (Mo. 2013); Jacob Barker,
Paul McKee’s Northside Regeneration Accused of Tax Credit Fraud in Lawsuit by Missouri
Attorney General, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (June 14, 2018), https://www.stltoday.com/
business/local/paul-mckee-s-northside-regeneration-accused-of-tax-creditfraud/article_e067f2a6-18ec-5d5f-8e54-ab7a2f2cba0c.html
[https://perma.cc/K5S9-S552]
(describing attorney general’s lawsuit and its potential to terminate the financing agreement).
85. Norman Marcus, Air Rights in New York City: TDR, Zoning Lot Merger and the WellConsidered Plan, 50 BROOK. L. REV. 867, 900 (1984) (discussing the designation of a special
Theater District that both preserved the unique neighborhood flavor and provided developers
with general growth incentives).
86. Id. at 903.
87. See, e.g., TOM ANGOTTI, NEW YORK FOR SALE: COMMUNITY PLANNING CONFRONTS
GLOBAL REAL ESTATE 100 (2008) (discussing the way New York City began disposing of its
accumulated vacant properties).
88. Id. (“In the throes of the abandonment crisis, communities mobilized to stop the city
auctions.”).
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for affordable housing, among other uses.89 The RFP process allows
governments to solicit interest from developers to construct a particular
project.90 The RFP process is a way for government to access the market
when it seeks services at a fair price.91 Also, the RFP process is a way for
government to regulate private market activity—in this example, commercial
real estate development—in a way that is consistent with public law norms.92
B. Competitiveness: State and Local Government Arguments for Economic
Development Activities
In the last thirty years, state and local government incentive spending has
spiked.93 A number of states stand out. New York leads at over $13 billion.94
Close behind are Washington State at just under $12 billion, Michigan at just
under $11 billion, and Louisiana at just under $10 billion.95
It is commonplace for businesses to pit states and cities against each other
when choosing where to locate a new factory or headquarters.96 In addition,
to retain existing businesses, governors and local executive officials routinely
argue that subsidies are needed to keep businesses in a given locale.97 These
subsidies are largely a response to threats from private companies to move
their operations elsewhere.98 Thus, the reasoning goes, jurisdictions need to
offer subsidies to remain competitive.99
89. DENVER OFFICE OF ECON. DEV., 2018 REQUEST FOR PROPOSALS (RFP) 1 (2018),
https://www.denvergov.org/content/dam/denvergov/Portals/344/documents/RealEstate/rfp/8
315/East%20Colfax%20RFP_Final_8315.pdf [https://perma.cc/5JKX-MJ7B].
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. See id. (proposing that affordable housing be constructed). Fundamentally, land use
controls differ from direct economic development support. State or local governments
exclusively provide land-use controls. Land is unique. Economic development loans, grants,
or other incentives are financial in nature. Developers can choose to take or leave them. See
Vicki Been, Community Benefits Agreements: A New Local Government Tool or Another
Variation on the Exactions Theme?, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 5, 34 (2010) (noting that when local
governments elect to subsidize a project, any developer who opposes the local government’s
restrictions can simply decline to be involved).
93. See BARTIK, supra note 14, at 1 (“Business incentives have more than tripled since
1990.”).
94. See MATTERA ET AL., supra note 1 (estimating the total spending in New York State
to be $13,344,524,119 across 33 projects receiving at least $50 million in subsidies).
95. Id. (estimating the total spending for Washington State to be $11,944,000,000 across
just two projects, for Michigan to be $10,891,136,000 over 35 projects, and for Louisiana to
be $9,716,976,012 over 26 projects).
96. See Amazon News, supra note 19 (describing the 238 cities that pitched Amazon
incentives to locate new headquarters); Tesla, Nevada Agree on Finalized Incentive
Agreement, L.V. SUN (Aug. 3, 2015), https://lasvegassun.com/news/2015/aug/03/teslanevada-agree-finalized-incentive-agreement/ [https://perma.cc/2928-7YLK].
97. See FLA. STAT. § 288.1088 (2018); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 481.078 (West 2019);
supra note 20 and accompanying text (describing two such funds in each state respectively).
98. In the Florida and Texas examples, the governors are authorized to use legislative
funds only when a company is considering another state in addition to either Florida or Texas.
See FLA. STAT. § 288.1088 (2018); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 481.078 (West 2019).
99. See FLA. STAT. § 288.1088 (2018) (“The Legislature therefore declares that sufficient
resources shall be available to respond to extraordinary economic opportunities and to
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Some businesses will pursue subsidies for expansion projects and argue
that subsidies are needed to prevent competition from another state.100 In the
case of the aerospace subsidy in Washington State, Boeing threatened
relocation to another state to, among other sweeteners, extract union
concessions.101 In another instance, Intel, one of the largest employers in
New Mexico, invested $26 billion in local expansion—financed through the
issuance of industrial development bonds.102 In contrast to the Boeing
incentive package, Intel’s arrangement with New Mexico merits additional
study. First, Intel is required to disclose how it is meeting the job targets
required in the bond issuance.103 Second, there are clawback provisions that
apply if Intel fails to meet its obligations under the bond issuance
agreement.104 This reporting requirement and clawback mechanism are
unique among projects of a similar subsidy size.105
A number of states, including Texas and Florida, empower their governors
to quickly close deals with businesses promising to engage in commercial
real estate development in their state. Texas’s governor can access a fund to
close deals with companies that threaten to move to another state because of
competition.106 The legislature created and funded the Texas Enterprise
Fund in 2003.107 Through the end of September 2018, the Texas Enterprise
Fund offered over $609 million—and disbursed over $503 million—in
support of a claimed 93,806 direct jobs.108 Of the amount disbursed, over
$48 million was repaid and almost $28 million was recovered through a
liquidated damages repayment—a clawback.109
Florida has adopted a similar approach to Texas. The Florida legislature
ratified a Quick Action Closing Fund to give the governor’s office the
resources to rapidly close deals.110 This fund has proven controversial and
compete effectively for these high-impact business facilities, critical private infrastructure in
rural areas, and key businesses in economically distressed urban or rural communities . . . .”).
100. This was certainly the case with the Boeing example. See General Information:
Employment Data, supra note 3.
101. See Scott, supra note 3.
102. Rachel Sams, Intel Rio Rancho Capital Spending Rises as Jobs Decline Appears to
Slow, ALBUQUERQUE BUS. FIRST (Apr. 17, 2018, 5:40 PM), https://www.bizjournals.com/
albuquerque/news/2018/04/17/intel-rio-rancho-capital-spending-rises-as-jobs.html
[https://perma.cc/T9A4-L2GU] (describing Intel’s reporting and compliance with terms
agreed to with New Mexico in exchange for jobs subsidies).
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. The author reviewed the fifty most expensive subsidies in the Good Jobs First database
and found that New Mexico was an early adopter of the clawback requirement. See MATTERA
ET AL., supra note 1, at 3.
106. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 481.078(k) (West 2019); see also Texas Enterprise
Fund, TEX. ECON. DEV., https://gov.texas.gov/business/page/texas-enterprise-fund [https://
perma.cc/YZ23-CCVH] (last visited Aug. 22, 2019).
107. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 481.078 (West 2019).
108. Texas Enterprise Fund (TEF) as of September 30, 2018, TEX. ECON. DEV.,
https://gov.texas.gov/uploads/files/business/TEF_Listing_10-11-18.pdf
[https://perma.cc/
8BWY-E292] (last visited Aug. 22, 2019).
109. Id.
110. See FLA. STAT. § 288.1088 (2018).
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several prominent Republican state legislators zeroed it out in recent budget
negotiations, calling it “corporate welfare.”111 Governor Rick Scott, in
seeking $85 million for the fund from the legislature, said, “Florida has to
compete with 49 other states and global markets across the world for jobs
and I will fight to make sure we have every available tool to remain
competitive.”112 Arguments for the need to subsidize businesses based on
competition grounds have a similar, if not stale, odor.
Public outrage about government subsidies for private companies
generally falls into one of three categories. One category of outrage stems
from companies taking incentives and then cutting jobs and closing plants
anyway.113 This category of outrage is illustrated by workers in the Midwest
who are disillusioned by competition from overseas manufacturing.114 Many
of them responded to the economic nationalism message of the 2016 Trump
campaign.115
A second category is outrage about subsidies attracting new companies
from outside a jurisdiction. A third category is general outrage at the idea of
the government propping up private companies at all. Outrage in this broad
category comes from liberals who would prefer government to invest in
public infrastructure projects, education, health care, and more.116 In
addition, outrage in this category comes from conservatives who would
prefer government to cut taxes and reduce its size and influence over private
111. Matt Dixon, Scott’s Divisive Incentive Fund Attracts Big Deals, and Its Share of
Critics, POLITICO (Jan. 6, 2017, 5:31 AM), https://www.politico.com/states/florida/
story/2017/01/scotts-divisive-incentive-fund-attracts-big-deals-and-its-share-of-critics108509 [https://perma.cc/R9HS-U6NF].
112. Id.
113. Autoworker outrage in Michigan and other Midwest states is illustrative. The
Michigan legislature, for example, has acted to keep and grow jobs in the auto industry and
other fields. In particular, Michigan’s legislature passed the Michigan Economic Growth
Authority Act in 1995 to provide job creation tax incentives to businesses. See MICH. COMP.
LAWS § 207.801 (1995). Some of the incentives proved too favorable to automakers, like
General Motors, which agreed to limit its most recent round of incentives from 2009, but per
agreement with the state, failed to disclose the total amount of the incentives. See Livengood
et al., supra note 22.
114. See Scott Horsley, Trump Administration Threatens to Withhold Subsidies from GM,
NPR (Nov. 27, 2018, 3:26 PM), https://www.npr.org/2018/11/27/671231681/trumpadministration-threatens-to-withhold-subsidies-from-gm [https://perma.cc/F4TH-6V89].
115. President Trump’s 2016 victory in Pennsylvania can be attributed in part to his margin
of victory in Luzerne County, a county that twice went for Obama. In 2016, 60 percent of
Trump’s 44,000 vote win in Pennsylvania came from Luzerne County (26,000 votes). At the
same time, manufacturing jobs in Luzerne County have declined from 42,000 in 1980 to
19,000 now. Shannon M. Monnat & David L. Brown, More Than A Rural Revolt: Landscapes
of Despair and the 2016 Presidential Election, 55 J. RURAL STUD. 227, 236 (2017).
116. See, e.g., Editorial, Amazon News Shows How Corporate Incentive Arms Race Is Bad
for Delaware: Editorial, DEL. ONLINE (Nov. 14, 2018, 4:43 PM), https://
www.delawareonline.com/story/opinion/editorials/2018/11/14/amazon-news-showsproblem-incentive-arms-race-editorial/1999842002/ [https://perma.cc/Y7DS-BUJZ] (arguing
that states should compete for jobs by investing in infrastructure, education, and job training);
see also Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez (@AOC), TWITTER (Nov. 12, 2018, 11:40 PM),
https://twitter.com/Ocasio2018/status/1062203458227503104
[https://perma.cc/6WS2U9EW] (“We’ve been getting calls and outreach from Queens residents all day about this.
The community’s response? Outrage.”).
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citizens and the economy.117 Criticism of the recent Amazon HQ2 and HQ3
selection processes illustrates both the second and third types of outrage from
both ends of the political spectrum.118 Unsurprisingly, Amazon is steeling
itself against popular outrage by engaging local lobbyists to protect its
promised incentives.119
None of the examples or programs mentioned in this section made use of
auctions to distribute incentives. The named categories of outrage will be
revisited in the context of potential solutions. For now, the focus of the
discussion shifts to the potential negative impacts of private economic
development activity on state and local budgets.
C. Fiscal Risks to State and Local Governments Due to Economic
Development Activities
A challenge to analyzing the effectiveness of a given program is lack of
information. A number of state economic development programs, often led
by independent economic development agencies authorized to cut deals,
involve a very low degree of transparency.120 In some instances, economic
development programs have caused state revenue crises as the programs were
implemented. The Empire Zone program,121 which lapsed in 2010 in New
York State, failed to restart economic activity in rust-belt cities like Buffalo,
Rochester, and Syracuse.122 But there were bright spots in the Empire Zone
program, such as a new microchip manufacturing plant in the Saratoga
Springs area opened by worldwide semiconductor company Global
Foundries.123
Yet, data on the Empire Zone program is difficult to obtain.124 Local
governments were given autonomy to draw boundaries of specific zones.125
New York was not unique in making these types of missteps. However, the
117. See Editorial, supra note 8.
118. See Veronique De Rugy, Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez Is Right About Amazon’s
Corporate Welfare, NAT’L REV. (Nov. 13, 2018, 2:36 PM), https://www.nationalreview.com/
corner/rep-alexandria-ocasio-cortez-is-right-about-amazons-corporate-welfare/
[https://perma.cc/K4VC-ZPBC].
119. See Ankita Rao, Amazon Is Bringing in Elite Lobbyists Amid Seething Rage Over
HQ2, VICE (Dec. 6, 2018, 5:56 PM), https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/nepq7q/amazon-isbringing-in-elite-lobbyists-amid-seething-rage-over-hq2 [https://perma.cc/K5Z8-9GPF].
120. See, e.g., Michigan Economic Growth Authority Act, MICH. COMP. LAWS § 207.801
(2019); S. 1-B, 1999–2000 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 1999) (enacted).
121. See N.Y. S. 1-B.
122. See Knauss, supra note 23. Notably, the Empire Zone program allowed businesses to
take credits over fourteen years, allowed for refundability of those tax credits, and permitted
(early on) “shirt changing” where a company could double dip on the credits by changing its
corporate names. Id. The program also supported retail, an industry that experts argue should
not be subsidized. See BARTIK, supra note 14, at 13, 50. Law firms took advantage too. See
Knauss, supra note 23.
123. This plant brought 3000 jobs to New York State’s Capital Region at a subsidy of
around $1 billion, around half of which came through Empire Zone tax credits. See Knauss,
supra note 23.
124. One journalist in Syracuse obtained information following a Freedom of Information
Law request. Id.
125. Id. (discussing how hydro companies paid local governments to draw boundaries).
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Empire Zone program brought New York to the top of the standings in terms
of state spending on private economic development activity.126
In one particularly egregious example, a developer in Syracuse, New York
engaged in planning that was “dominated by brainstorming ways to use
taxpayers’ money” to expand Destiny USA—a shopping mall.127 The
developer “worked with a philosophy that nothing could get in the project’s
way—not laws, financial hurdles or the practical difficulty of building
something so big.”128 Support from local government was all but assured.
As a result, the group “never worried about opposition from City Hall . . .
[because] the city [w]as desperate for development.”129
The most fanciful plans for the Destiny USA project ultimately did not
come to fruition.130 The scope of the project was impractical and otherwise
seemingly aimless, other than the fact that it was designed to soak up tax
incentives.131 After building a vastly scaled-down version of what was
originally planned, Pyramid, the developer, announced that it would not
move forward with the remaining planned development.132 Yet, the local tax
base has not grown since the company still retains decades of local property
tax exemptions.133
The Destiny USA example teaches three lessons. First, developers
frequently view themselves as having leverage over city officials because the
declining Rust Belt needs economic development to grow tax revenue.
Second, focusing on low-wage sectors, like retail, typically will not be
fruitful compared to high-skilled, high-paying sectors of the economy like
high-tech services and manufacturing. Third, the law should scrutinize
efforts to subsidize private economic development activity undertaken
without meaningful review, oversight, transparency, or accountability.134
The Michigan Economic Growth Act, which was implemented by the
Michigan Economic Development Corporation (MEDC), is also noteworthy
for its lack of transparency and fiscal precariousness.135 The act created the
Michigan Economic Growth Authority (MEGA), which oversaw a tax credit
program intended to prop up the declining auto manufacturing sector during
the Great Recession.136 In a moment of questionable legislation, the program
126. See BARTIK, supra note 14, at 68.
127. See John O’Brien, Inside Planning Destiny USA: It Was All About the “Golden Cow”
of Tax Breaks, SYRACUSE.COM (July 1, 2012), https://www.syracuse.com/news/index.ssf/
2012/07/inside_planning_destiny_usa_it.html [https://perma.cc/2TV9-YZTZ].
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Rick Moriarty & Tim Knauss, Destiny USA’s Untaxed Anti-climax: After 13 Years,
It Is What It Is, SYRACUSE.COM (June 7, 2012), https://www.syracuse.com/news/
index.ssf/2012/06/destiny_usas_untaxed_anti-clim.html [https://perma.cc/Q7JC-VU3T].
131. See O’Brien, supra note 127.
132. See Moriarty & Knauss, supra note 130.
133. Id.
134. For a discussion of “opportunity zones,” see infra Part IV.D.
135. See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 207.801 (2019).
136. See id.; Chad Livengood, Michigan Pays Price for Auto Investment, DET. NEWS (Feb.
5, 2015, 12:15 PM), https://detroitnews.com/story/news/politics/2015/02/05/michigan-taxcredits-car-companies/22908711/ [https://perma.cc/3NRP-32XA].
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issued unlimited tax incentives to the largest auto manufacturers.137 In one
instance, General Motors (GM) only agreed to cap the amount of tax credits
it received following a massive impending fiscal crisis.138 In exchange for
not having to disclose the value of the tax credits, GM finally agreed to a
cap.139 Eventually, in July 2014, Michigan reported that GM’s tax credits
exceeded $2.1 billion.140 Ford agreed to cap its tax credits at $2.3 billion,
and Fiat Chrysler agreed to a $1.7 billion cap.141
Since both the Empire Zone and MEGA programs have ended, it is
difficult to obtain data about the programs. Focus on newer replacement
programs also further obscures the prior programs. This is unfortunate since
the original programs themselves were no help to state fiscal budgets. State
governments have had difficulty being successful in this area. In most cases,
government fails because it is trying to do more than private companies: it
seeks to either extend a mature and declining industry or actively launch a
new technology sector.142
II. DOCTRINAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS HAVE FAILED TO
CONSTRAIN JOB-BUYING LAWMAKING
Legal and judicial efforts have failed to check wealth redistribution to
private companies. Historically, the shift to industrialization and new
developments in technology have led state governments to encourage private
enterprise.143 In the mid-1800s, new infrastructure projects, such as canals,
bridges, and railroads, brought about direct government support for
companies.144 When particular enterprises failed—canal corporations went
bankrupt or railroad companies collapsed—the public scrutinized
government support for private industries.145 Significantly, the years
137. See Jarrett Skorup, MEGA Failure: Job Projections from Michigan Tax Credit
Program Rarely Came True, MICH. CAPITOL CONFIDENTIAL (May 15, 2014),
https://www.michigancapitolconfidential.com/MEGA-program-a-complete-failure [https://
perma.cc/6F86-YTDW] (noting that the “original cap on the number of credits issued per year
was eliminated”).
138. See Livengood et al., supra note 22.
139. See id.
140. See Livengood, supra note 136 (“Michigan faces years of budget uncertainty because
state leaders awarded billions of dollars in tax credits mostly to Detroit’s three automakers to
save tens of thousands of manufacturing jobs during the Great Recession . . . . General Motors
has been awarded more than $2.1 billion in refundable tax credits by the Granholm and Snyder
administrations—the most of any automaker.”).
141. Id.
142. MARIANA MAZZUCATO, THE ENTREPRENEURIAL STATE: DEBUNKING PUBLIC VS.
PRIVATE SECTOR MYTHS 18 (2015).
143. Ellis Leigh Waldron, The Public Purpose Doctrine of Taxation 34 (1952)
(unpublished B.A. thesis, University of Washington) (on file with author) (“The tremendous
capital demands of canal, road and railroad development were at that time beyond the reach
and inclination of private capital reserves. So the state governments assumed the burden.”).
144. Id. at 34–35 (noting that in New York, income from fees to use the Erie Canal offset
the need for the state to levy taxes to pay for the cost of the canal’s construction).
145. Several factors led to the change in public attitude against government assisting
private businesses: (1) high rates of default, (2) a belief that private companies did not need
public support, (3) skepticism about government favoring some companies over others, (4)
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between the financial crises of 1837 and 1857 were some of the most frenzied
in the area of developing the “internal arteries of commerce.”146 Much of
the investment dollars that fueled the construction binge of the time came
from foreign European shores.147
At the same time, cities and towns were, and continue to be, dependent on
private economic development activity.148 Thus, planning, designing,
constructing, and maintaining infrastructure to support private enterprise is
closely aligned with the goals of local elected officials and administrative
agency staff.149 The importance of attracting and retaining private businesses
is central to the existence of state and local administrative agencies.150
Yet, information about state and local incentives to private businesses is
very limited.151 Further, studies suggest that no state tests whether the
legislative efforts to create jobs through incentives are working.152 As a
result, it is unclear whether economic growth actually results from economic
development activity by government.153 Nevertheless, lawmakers continue
to dole out incentives to private companies.154 Two primary legal
constraints, one doctrinal and one constitutional, have developed to limit
government support for economic development activities.
The public purpose doctrine emerged in response to a number of concerns
about wasteful government spending. Each of the fifty states has codified
the public purpose doctrine by placing limits on direct gifts, loans, or the

fear of corruption, (5) fear of government’s intervention in free markets, and (6) government
not sharing in the profits of private enterprise. Gold, supra note 28, at 201.
146. Waldron, supra note 143, at 32 (describing significant public infrastructure
investment in railroads as “produc[ing] more wealth, more waste, more hope and disillusion
than any previous twenty years in the country’s history” (quoting THOMAS C. COCHRAN &
WILLIAM MILLER, THE AGE OF ENTERPRISE 52 (1942))).
147. Id.
148. Mulligan, supra note 16, at 2023 (describing local government incentive payments to
induce businesses to locate within the granting jurisdiction).
149. State and local officials are also under increasing pressure to maintain businessfriendly social and economic policy as a means of encouraging economic development. The
recent “Bathroom Bill” in North Carolina allowing LGBT discrimination led to athletic
conferences and private companies pressuring the state to change the law. See Richard C.
Schragger, The Attack on American Cities, 96 TEX. L. REV. 1163, 1229 (2018) (“[The North
Carolina bathroom ban] is also an example of how economic development remains a central
concern of state and local politicians and an important driver of policy.”).
150. An early example of a state agency charged with economic development is the New
York State Urban Development Corporation. Gold, supra note 28, at 215. For a discussion of
local administrative agencies in modern urban governance, see generally Nestor M. Davidson,
Localist Administrative Law, 126 YALE L.J. 564 (2017).
151. See BARTIK, supra note 14, at 11718.
152. See BRANDON BROCKMYER ET AL., PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, EVIDENCE COUNTS:
EVALUATING STATE TAX INCENTIVES FOR JOBS AND GROWTH 1 (2012) (“[N]o state regularly
and rigorously tests whether those investments are working and ensures lawmakers consider
this information when deciding whether to use them, how much to spend, and who should get
them.”).
153. Richard Schragger makes this point over the course of his recent book, City Power.
Schragger argues that we ought to be skeptical generally about subnational governments
making industrial policy. See generally SCHRAGGER, supra note 27.
154. See Story et al., supra note 11.
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extension of government credit for private interests.155 Additionally, state
constitutional amendments followed the development of the public purpose
doctrine.
Yet, courts are unwilling to constrain state and local spending on private
businesses. The public purpose doctrine is ineffective as a limit on legislative
action.156 Courts broadly interpret the public purposes of economic
development activities to fall within allowable limits.157 Also, courts read a
public purpose exception into constitutional limits on government spending
for private enterprise.158
A. Courts Defer to Legislatures in Broadly Interpreting the Public
Purposes of Economic Development Activities
Generally, the government may not use public funds for the benefit of
private interests.159 There must be a public purpose when government
allocates public resources. The definition of a public purpose, however, is
not well-settled in the law.160 Courts apply a broad standard: the legislature
has broad discretion to determine whether an action constitutes a public
purpose.161 Courts should only restrain “clearly evasive” legislative
actions.162
As early as the mid-1800s, courts addressed matters involving the
authority of cities to levy taxes to pay for state-supported infrastructure
projects. One case in the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia, Goddin v.
Crump,163 involved a tax levied by the city of Richmond to fund the purchase
of shares in a state-chartered corporation whose purpose was to connect
Richmond to the Ohio River via canal.164 The court in Goddin held that the
155. Rubin, supra note 36, at 1313 n.15 (“All fifty states either have amended their
constitutions to include the [public purpose] doctrine or the doctrine has received judicial
sanction.”).
156. Briffault, supra note 31, at 945.
157. Robert S. Amdursky, The Urban Crisis, Private Enterprise, and State Constitutions:
A Plan for Action, 19 SYRACUSE L. REV. 618, 631 (1968) (“All that is necessary to insure the
constitutionality of a particular expenditure is a legislative finding of public purpose
confirmed by the state’s highest court.”).
158. Id. (“[N]o state decision on ‘public purpose’ has ever been overruled by the Supreme
Court.”).
159. See State ex rel. Ohio Cty. Comm’n v. Samol, 275 S.E.2d 2, 9 (W. Va. 1980) (Neely,
C.J., concurring); Waldron, supra note 143, at 1 (“Midway through the nineteenth century,
American courts developed the idea that government may tax its people only if such exactions
are to finance objects of [public] benefits.”).
160. Rubin, supra note 36, at 1313 (arguing that no real limits exist on the government’s
power to raise a tax to enrich a private company regardless of whether the current judicial test
is to find a public benefit or simply judicial obedience to legislative findings).
161. Associated Gen. Contractors of S.D., Inc. v. Schreiner, 492 N.W.2d 916, 923 (S.D.
1992) (“Determining whether a statutory purpose is public or private is pretty much a matter
of policy and wisdom for the legislature. In making such a decision it is vested with a large
discretion with which courts should not interfere unless its action is clearly evasive.” (quoting
Clem v. City of Yankton, 160 N.W.2d 125, 131 (S.D. 1968))).
162. Id.
163. 35 Va. (8 Leigh) 120 (1837).
164. Id. at 133–36.
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local ordinance authorizing the city tax collector to seize the property of
residents who refused to pay the tax was valid.165
A number of other early cases addressed governmental power to delegate
the authority to levy taxes for public purposes. Sharpless v. Mayor of
Philadelphia166 involved the subscription of railway stock.167 While the
court in Sharpless upheld the legislation authorizing the purchase of railroad
company shares, Chief Justice Jeremiah S. Black found that if the facts
involved a taking of private property for private use, then such a taking would
be unconstitutional.168
The first appearance of the public purpose doctrine in the U.S. Supreme
Court was in Loan Ass’n v. Topeka169 in 1874.170 In that case, the local
government used tax revenue to pay interest on bonds sold to support the
development of an ironworks manufacturing company.171 The intent was to
increase bridge construction.172 A financial company that had bought the
bonds sued when the city failed to make interest payments.173 The Court
held the bond issuance impermissible because the city had not established a
public purpose in extending the city’s credit.174 The Court’s opinion did
suggest that expenditures not reliant on levying a tax might be permissible.175
This distinction places in contrast project revenue bonds, funded through

165. Id.
166. 21 Pa. 147 (1853).
167. See generally id.
168. See id. at 167; Waldron, supra note 143, at 90 (“While it would be ‘palpably
unconstitutional’ to take private property for private use, [Justice] Black could discover ‘no
taking at all’ in the present case.” (quoting Sharpless, 21 Pa. at 167 (opinion of Black, C.J.))).
169. 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 655 (1874).
170. Id. at 664. In Justice Samuel Freeman Miller’s opinion:
To lay with one hand the power of the government on the property of the citizen,
and with the other to bestow it upon favorited individuals to aid private enterprises
and build up private fortunes, is nonetheless a robbery because it is done under the
forms of law and is called taxation. This is not legislation. It is a decree under
legislative forms.
Id. Note that Justice Miller’s opinion in Loan Ass’n was not necessarily motivated by some
high-minded concept of free market economics. In the Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. (16
Wall.) 36 (1873) the year before, Justice Miller’s majority opinion upheld a Louisiana law that
granted a twenty-five-year monopoly to a private business to maintain slaughterhouses in and
around New Orleans.
171. Loan Ass’n, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) at 656 (“The bonds on their face purported to be
payable to the King Wrought-Iron Bridge Manufacturing and Iron-Works Company, of
Topeka, to aid and encourage that company in establishing and operating bridge shops . . . .”).
172. Id. (noting that the intent was “to encourage that company in its design of establishing
a manufactory of iron bridges in that city”).
173. Id. at 656–57 (describing the tax assessed to pay the bonds and the action brought for
payment on the bonds).
174. Id. at 664.
175. Id. at 659 (“If these municipal corporations . . . have a fund or other property out of
which they can pay the debts which they contract, without resort to taxation, it may be within
the power of the legislature of the State to authorize them to use it in aid of projects strictly
private . . . .”).
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project fees, and general obligation bonds, which states may pay for using
tax revenue.176
State courts, where most litigation related to the public purpose doctrine
originates, quickly applied Loan Ass’n’s limits on taxation for private
purposes.177 However, the public purpose doctrine was never a total
Nevertheless, state and local
limitation on legislative actions.178
governments largely avoided the limits set by Loan Ass’n with non-tax,
alternative financing arrangements.179 Further, on principle, courts are
increasingly restrained in their efforts to invalidate programs approved by
legislatures.
Judicial restraint has led to mixed results and no clear rules. Cases
involving taxation for the purposes of marketing or promoting agricultural
products, for example, are often decided based on how economically
important judges determine a particular product to be. Maine’s highest court
was willing to uphold a potato tax to support farming because potato
production is significant to the state’s economy.180 But a similar tax on
apples in West Virginia was rejected since apple production is only an
incidental part of that state’s economy.181
State court decisions largely rest on legislative findings associated with the
given subsidy program.182 In State ex rel. Ohio County Commission v.
Samol,183 a 1980 case before the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia,
for instance, the court relied on legislative findings to uphold a state law
authorizing counties and cities to issue bonds for commercial real estate
projects.184 General legislative findings supporting the spending of public

176. Gold, supra note 28, at 204 (distinguishing general obligation bonds that are backed
by full faith and credit from project revenue bonds that are not).
177. See, e.g., Weismer v. Village of Douglas, 64 N.Y. 91, 103 (1876) (“[T]hese are not
the direct and immediate public uses and purpose to which money taken by tax may be
directed.”). In another example, in People v. Westchester County National Bank of Peekskill,
New York’s highest court invalidated a county tax used to fund a payment to veterans of the
First World War. See 132 N.E. 241, 247 (N.Y. 1921).
178. See Briffault, supra note 31, at 912 (“The public purpose requirement was never a
complete bar to government financial assistance to the private sector.”).
179. See supra Part I.A.
180. See State v. F. H. Vahlsing, Inc., 88 A.2d 144, 150 (Me. 1952) (“[W]e must so hold
where the industry for the benefit of which the tax is levied is as important and as basic as is
the potato industry to the State of Maine which imposes the tax.”). “What justifies the tax is
that the money expended for the promotion of the potato industry is not primarily expended
for the benefit of those individuals engaged therein but for the benefit of the people as a
whole . . . .” Id.
181. See Lingamfelter v. Brown, 52 S.E.2d 687, 693–94 (W. Va. 1949) (“[T]he growing
and moving of commercial apples . . . is not an enterprise or undertaking of such size as to
impress it with a public interest. . . . [T]he monetary returns from such business are . . . not
sufficient to characterize that business as one of the principal commercial or agricultural
enterprises of the State . . . .”).
182. See, e.g., State ex rel. Ohio Cty. Comm’n v. Samol, 275 S.E.2d 2, 4 (W. Va. 1980).
183. 275 S.E.2d 2 (W. Va. 1980).
184. Id. at 4 (“Section 2 thereof declares as a matter of legislative finding that the lack of
employment and business opportunities in many areas of this state has created a critically
adverse condition; that the development of new commercial, industrial and manufacturing
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funds for a private purpose seem sufficient for courts to avoid invaliding a
state law.185
Analysis of twenty years of case law reveals that state courts are unlikely
to find government programs illegal based on the public purpose doctrine.186
The scholarly discussion about the public purpose doctrine has focused on its
toothlessness.187 However, the common law alone was not the only legal
tool used to reign in government spending on economic development
activity.
State constitutional amendments followed the development of the public
purpose doctrine. Many states in the first half of the 1880s adopted
constitutional prohibitions on state support for private companies. In certain
instances, state constitutional amendments were designed to limit local
government support for railroads.188
Scholars argue that such provisions prevent states and cities from engaging
in much of the economic development activity that takes place today.189
Federal courts are reluctant to overturn the decisions of state courts that are
political in nature once state court judges have sanctioned state and local
legislative activities.190
In the background is the broadening of the meaning of public purpose,
which was discussed in Kelo v. City of New London.191 Although the
backlash to the Kelo decision led to state constitutional amendments limiting
the ability of states to condemn property through eminent domain,192 the

plants is essential to relieve such condition . . . .” (quoting State ex rel. Cty. Court v. Kemp,
151 S.E.2d 680, 683 (W. Va. 1966))).
185. Note the legislative findings discussed in the Washington State tax preference for the
aerospace industry. See generally S. 5952, 63d Leg., 3d Spec. Sess. (Wash. 2013) (enacted).
186. See Libgober, supra note 32, at 23 (arguing that based on case study research from
1994 to 2014 courts are almost guaranteed not to limit a legislative action based on a public
purpose challenge).
187. See, e.g., Briffault, supra note 31, at 909. As Briffault points out, the lack of
enforcement of the public purpose doctrine and its constitutional counterparts demonstrates
the difficulties inherent in enforcing state constitutions. Id.
188. Gold, supra note 28, at 209.
189. See, e.g., Tew, supra note 76, at 172.
190. The Guarantee Clause of the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution states that
“The United States shall guarantee to every State . . . a Republican Form of Government . . . .”
U.S. CONST. amend. IV, § 4. Courts have interpreted the Guarantee Clause to find
nonjusticiable issues of a political nature; nonetheless, scholars argue that courts can decide
matters falling under the Guarantee Clause. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Cases Under the
Guarantee Clause Should Be Justiciable, 65 COLO. L. REV. 849, 851–52 (1994). In the takings
context, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor noted the Court’s deference to legislative decisions
about what constitutes a public purpose. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 499
(2005) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“[W]e emphasized the importance of deferring to
legislative judgments about public purpose.”); see also Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32
(1954) (“The legislature, not the judiciary, is the main guardian of the public needs to be served
by social legislation.”).
191. 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
192. See, e.g., Ilya Somin, The Limits of Backlash: Assessing the Political Response to
Kelo, 93 MINN. L. REV. 2100, 2102 (2009) (“The Kelo backlash probably resulted in more
new state legislation than any other Supreme Court decision in history.”).
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often weak enforcement of existing state constitutional prohibitions in
support for private companies is perhaps instructive.193
The push and pull of constitutional limitation versus deregulation is
significant.
Proponents of constitutional interpretation through a
deregulatory lens view competition among neighboring states as a guiding
principle. If, for instance, a number of Southern states permitted local
governments to support private manufacturing through the construction of a
new plant, then why should Florida not permit it as well?194
Judicial interpretation of constitutional limits on subsidies for private
industry can be separated from the interpretation of whether there is a public
purpose.195 Step one is to establish a public purpose. Assuming a court can
find a public purpose, step two is to evaluate whether the particular bond
issue (in the case of industrial development bonds) constitutes the city
pledging its credit. If the city is not pledging its credit, for instance in the
case of a bond that is a private activity bond as opposed to a general
obligation bond, then the activity should not be prohibited by the
constitution.196
B. Existing Proposals for Substantive and Procedural Constraints
Scholars have not fully addressed the government’s substantive and
procedural challenges in constraining economic development activity.
Substantively, the public purpose doctrine fails because of judicial inability
to craft doctrinal constraints that limit state and local spending.197
Specifically, the doctrine lacks a clear substantive definition of a public
purpose. Much of the public purpose litigation relates to the government’s
ability to levy taxes to support particular economic activities.198 Public
purpose litigation illustrates the challenges courts have faced in crafting clear
doctrinal constraints.
It might seem attractive to entirely outlaw state and local government
spending outside of public infrastructure improvement. This is the purest
and simplest limit. However, it is unlikely that courts would exert such
constraints on their own without some galvanizing facts. The political
pressure to redistribute wealth in order to claim credit for attracting and
retaining employers is very powerful.199 As a result, such a total ban seems
unlikely in the near term.
Another proposal focuses on analyzing state and local agency
professionals under agency law rather than contract law.200 This forces
193. See Libgober, supra note 32, at 7.
194. See Tew, supra note 76, at 174.
195. See id. at 173.
196. Id.
197. See Rubin, supra note 36, at 1346 (“Yet, the significance of [disastrous public aid to
railroads] and the evils that gave rise to it have been lost on present judiciaries who find a
public purpose in almost any proposed government expenditure.”).
198. See, e.g., Waldron, supra note 143, at 1.
199. See JENSEN & MALESKY, supra note 48, at 227.
200. See Libgober, supra note 32, at 55.
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courts to apply an agency standard—which looks at whether the agent acted
in the public’s interest—instead of a contractual one.201 Applying an agency
law approach offers a wealth of case law and analysis for courts to draw on
in interpreting job-buying cases.202 Another proposal argues for the
increased role of the attorney general in constraining spending by the
legislature.203
Another argument proposes that Congress should ban state and local
incentives to businesses and should impose federal tax on such incentives to
discourage them.204 This proposal, articulated by Arthur Rolnick, is a “stick”
approach to limiting spending.205 Other tax regimes, like the federal, state,
and local tools available to preserve affordable housing created through the
LIHTC, offer carrots as well.206 Rolnick’s suggestion to tax private
companies for public incentives bears merit. Crafting appropriate language
to capture potentially harmful spending would require much care.
Reforms at the federal level seem necessary given the pervasive nature of
state and local spending on private businesses. Any reform effort that does
not include federal action is liable to face piecemeal implementation. In Part
IV, this Article will revisit federal reforms and detail the next steps in
regulating job-buying.
Fundamentally, any reform needs to involve cooperation among state and
local lawmakers. On the cooperation theme, David Reiss has suggested that
cities sharing similar population sizes should cooperate in agreeing not to
compete with one another for particular companies.207 This proposal is an
innovative twist on efforts to stop incentive border wars across state lines.
Kansas City is a well-known hot spot in this war.208 Recently, Missouri
adopted legislation that would prevent the issuance of tax incentives to lure
companies from adjoining counties in Kansas.209 On August 13, 2019,
201. Id. at 6.
202. Id.
203. Recently, the New Jersey attorney general has announced an investigation into that
state’s economic development spending. See Munoz, supra note 35 (“Attorney General Gurbir
Grewal . . . said his office would see if any civil or criminal laws were violated by companies
receiving tax breaks and if so, ‘seek the recovery of those funds.’”).
204. Arthur J. Rolnick & Melvin L. Burstein, Congress Should End the Economic War
Among the States, FED. RES. BANK MINNEAPOLIS (Jan. 1, 1995), https://
www.minneapolisfed.org/publications/annual-reports/congress-should-end-the-economicwar-among-the-states#f3 [https://perma.cc/W5Q6-WJ4A].
205. See id.
206. See Weiss, supra note 52, at 562.
207. David Reiss, The Hunger Games: Amazon Edition, N.Y.L.J. (Nov. 21, 2018, 2:25
PM),
https://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/2018/11/21/the-hunger-games-amazonedition/ [https://perma.cc/6T97-5AZR] (“A mutually beneficial and more economically
rational approach would be for certain tiers of cities to commit to not compete against each
other with direct subsidies to companies seeking to locate a new facility within their
borders.”).
208. See Episode 699: Why Did the Job Cross the Road?, supra note 10.
209. S. 182, 100th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2019) (enacted); see also Missouri
Offers Truce to Kansas in Business Incentive Battle, AP NEWS (May 17, 2019),
https://www.apnews.com/f275b4faf8dd47df893674a96c584bf3
[https://perma.cc/EAK5UQHT].
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Missouri Governor Mike Parson and Kansas Governor Laura Kelly signed
an agreement to end the use of tax incentives to attract companies across state
boundaries.210
Cooperation agreements to limit business incentives might follow the lead
of compacts or other collective agreements.211 For example, states and cities
could agree to refrain from issuing business location incentives if a certain
threshold of states, cities, or populations opt in.
In 2016, the Louisiana Governor John Bel Edwards shifted veto power
over industrial tax exemptions from the state to localities.212 Once the East
Baton Parish School exercised its newfound power to veto an ExxonMobil
project, however, state legislators introduced five bills to strip the local veto
right in favor of a state appointed commission.213 This battle illustrates the
tensions present between states and cities in legislating local conduct.
Others have argued for the European Union model that treats business
subsidies as export subsidies, which, if beyond a certain size, are deemed
illegal.214 The European Union can force the company to repay subsidies if
they exceed the allotted amount.215
In addition to the specific targets articulated above, there are guiding
principles that state and local elected officials should consider when
incentivizing private business. These include: clawbacks (recapturing
incentives if businesses fail to fulfill the incentives’ requirements); disclosure
(outlining what information businesses are required to submit to both justify
the subsidy and to support the transfer of the subsidy in practice); and
transparency (ensuring that the information disclosed is shared broadly with
the public).
One can imagine an economic impact statement being required, much the
way an environmental impact statement (EIS) is required for certain types of
developments. Typically, an EIS is required when commercial developers
seek land use approval or other approval to build from the government.
Governments issue handbooks on when EISs are necessary and how to draft
them if they are.216
210. See Kevin Hardy, ‘Sometimes Common Sense Does Prevail.’ Missouri, Kansas
Celebrate End of Border War, KAN. CITY STAR (Aug. 14, 2019), https://
www.kansascity.com/news/business/article233725152.html [https://perma.cc/5BTZ-CUQV].
211. Fifteen states have adopted legislation for a national popular election of the president.
“Agreement Among the States to Elect the President by National Popular Vote,” NAT’L
POPULAR VOTE (May 1, 2019), https://www.nationalpopularvote.com/sites/default/files/1pager-npv-v184-2019-5-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/H85Y-QNPG].
212. Mark Ballard, Multiple Bills Changing Industrial Tax Breaks Making Their Way
Through Legislature, ADVOCATE (Apr. 30, 2019, 3:36 PM), https://www.theadvocate.com/
baton_rouge/news/politics/legislature/article_99850102-6b87-11e9-a74707d24eb0aeed.html [https://perma.cc/2TYU-DK4J].
213. Id.
214. See generally Adinda Sinnaeve, How the EU Manages Subsidy Competition, in
REINING IN THE COMPETITION FOR CAPITAL 87 (Ann Markusen ed., 2007).
215. Id.
216. See, e.g., DIV. OF ENVTL. PERMITS, N.Y. ST. DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION, THE
SEQR HANDBOOK: FOURTH EDITION 2019 (2019) (draft), https://www.dec.ny.gov/
docs/permits_ej_operations_pdf/dseqrhandbook.pdf [https:// perma.cc/8HNF-9TUE]. For a
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Recently, cities and counties have required community impact reports
before proposed development projects are approved.217 Typical community
impact report ordinances are triggered by developments above a certain
square footage threshold.218 Community impact reports require a developer
to disclose financial information related to the development.219 Typical
requirements include the financial effect of the development on the city’s
potential revenue, the number of jobs created by the project, and its impact
on affordable housing.220
Market-based critics of a community economic impact statement will
likely be wary of additional regulation of development. They also will point
out that such regulation will simply drive development across a local border
to a neighboring town. These are valid criticisms. Therefore, such regulation
would be more effective if imposed on a county- or state-wide basis. That
would require all developers in a county or state to follow the same rules.
On the disclosure front, a community economic impact statement would
focus attention on the specific information that would (1) justify the public
investment and (2) ensure that the public was protected through updates.
From a transparency perspective, there is a lack of public information
about private economic development activity supported by state and local
governments. Timothy J. Bartik and others have called for additional
research and study of the available data.221 Some datasets, like the Good
Jobs First “megadeals” dataset222 and a similar one focused on New York,223
are recent attempts to aggregate and report the amount and breadth of these
subsidies. In the rush to keep states and cities competitive, government
programs may obfuscate the subsidy process.224 Efforts need to be taken to
include transparency in all efforts to support private economic development
activity.
Dale F. Rubin has argued that the solution is to have a nonprofit
organization dole out economic development subsidies.225 Since nonprofits
are mission-based organizations, they are more likely to guarantee a public
purpose.226 The trouble with this proposal is that it has been used in some
cases and the nonprofit model has not changed how states and cities subsidize
private actors. The MEDC, for instance, is a Michigan nonprofit that has

discussion of the environmental impact review process, see generally Ordonez v. City of New
York, No. 450100/2018, 2018 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 3002 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. July 11, 2018).
217. See id. (citing a 2001 Evanston, Wyoming resolution).
218. See, e.g., Petaluma City Council Res. 2008-189 N.C.S. (Cal. 2008) (enacted).
219. See id.
220. See id.
221. See BARTIK, supra note 14, at 11718.
222. See generally MATTERA ET AL., supra note 1.
223. Masako Melissa Hirsch et al., New York State Subsidy Tracker: Tracking the State’s
Growing Portfolio of Business Subsidies, PROPUBLICA (Mar. 27, 2017),
https://projects.propublica.org/subsidies [https://perma.cc/Y4WS-GAEK].
224. See supra Part I.B.
225. Rubin, supra note 36, at 1340–41.
226. See id.
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authority from the state legislature to subsidize private businesses.227 The
MEDC’s nonprofit status has not stopped the state from incentivizing private
businesses at its fiscal peril.228
This Article rejects the notion that substantive judicial interpretation of
public purpose can constrain state and city legislatures. The doctrinal and
constitutional inquiries are simply too muddled. Further, such substantive
decisions should not necessarily be left to the courts. Legislators, as
representatives accountable to the people, ought to have some flexibility to
determine what is in the interest of the public. However, that flexibility is
not absolute. It should not devolve into folly. State courts, in particular,
ought to play a role in reviewing failed efforts to grow and maintain jobs,
such as in the case of the Washington State tax incentive program for the
aerospace industry, as well as others.
III. A TWO-STEP REVERSE AUCTION AND CLAWBACK PROPOSAL
If lawmakers are buying jobs, then they should follow certain norms in
government purchasing. This Part draws from this scholarly conversation
about government contracting to explore how government can distribute
economic development subsidies more fairly. It presents a novel two-step
reverse auction and clawback solution for economic development activity
procurement that builds on public law principles like transparency, openness,
and accountability.
This Part draws on existing legal academic literature on government
contracting. Specifically, it places economic development activity squarely
within government contracting practices. Economic development activity
contracting is a more troublesome type of contracting because it requires the
government to seek private actors to do something for third parties—in this
case, hire them.
A. Two-Step Proposal to Ensure Fair Distribution of Public Funds
1. Where Does the Money Come From?: Revenue vs. General Obligation
Today, most economic development activity occurs through governmentissued revenue bonds as opposed to general obligation bonds.229 Interest and
principal payments on revenue bonds are paid through a stream of revenue,
like lease payments, fees, hotel taxes, or similar items. A private entity,
rather than the state or locality, is the obligor of the debt.
The federal government supports revenue bonds in a number of ways.
Notably, the interest on revenue bonds is tax-exempt. Thus, when a state or
local government sells revenue bonds on the financial markets, the
government passes the tax exemption through to the debt holder, such as the

227. See Michigan Economic Growth Authority Act, MICH. COMP. LAWS § 207.801 (2019).
228. See Livengood et al., supra note 22.
229. See supra Part I.
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company or developer receiving the proceeds of the bond, and ultimately to
investors.
Congress limits how much tax-exempt debt can be issued for private
activities as well as the types of projects that can access exempt debt.230
Certain types of projects have no limit to the amount of debt that can be
issued. These types include airports, docks and wharves, government-owned
solid waste disposal facilities, and qualified veterans’ mortgages.231 On the
other hand, debt issued for qualified tax-exempt organizations, such as
hospitals, is capped.232 In fact, over 65 percent of private activity bonds in
2015 went to constructing hospital facilities and other properties owned by
tax-exempt entities—this amounted to over $67 billion.233
It is also important to know that for capped projects, states were limited in
2018 to $37.5 billion in debt.234 For large states like California, Texas,
Florida, and New York, this worked out to $4.2 billion, $3 billion, $2.2
billion, and $2.1 billion respectively.235
Here, a state or local legislature could budget a particular amount of private
activity bond proceeds for capped and uncapped activities for private
economic development. Legislatures could publish a budgeted amount of
funds to inform companies that they can bid to access them.
2. Step One: The Reverse Auction
Instead of assuming that business location incentives are legitimate, we
ought to first question why and under what circumstances such incentives
ought to be extended to private companies. Economists might argue that
such incentives should be extended only during periods of economic
downturn, and they should be broadly available to private companies rather
than tailored to particular industries. Moreover, given the Amazon example,
there are frequent auctions from competing jurisdictions to lure the same
companies.
In spite of fiscal crises,236 some academic economic research indicates that
location-based incentives are useful to attract businesses.237 However, the
cost of attracting news businesses or jobs can be great. One study estimated
the cost of attracting a new business to a federal “empowerment zone” at
around $19 million per business.238 While state and local lawmakers may
want to create new businesses, they should want to do so in the least costly

230. See MAGUIRE & HUGHES, supra note 75, at 2.
231. Id. at 11.
232. Id. at 14.
233. Id. at 14–15 (The sum of the percentage of qualified hospital facilities and qualified
section 501(c)(3) non-hospitals exceeded 65 percent in 2015.).
234. Id. at 12.
235. Id. at 17–18.
236. See supra Part I.C.
237. See Andrew Hanson & Shawn Rohlin, Do Location-Based Tax Incentives Attract New
Business Establishments?, 51 J. REGIONAL SCI. 427, 429 (2011).
238. Id. at 428.
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way possible. To do this, officials must focus on auction design, monitoring,
and review.
Already, the government uses auctions to sell goods and services that it
otherwise would need to set a price for.239 Auctioning is frequently used in
the private sector too. For example, online advertising providers host
auctions to determine what ads will appear to a given user.240 The reverse
auction, conceptually, is closely aligned with the notion of an auction.
Instead of the award going to the highest bidder, in a reverse auction, it goes
to the lowest.
Readers who have recently flown on a commercial airline will likely be
familiar with the reverse auction process. On flights with oversold seats,
airlines will ask passengers, frequently at a check-in kiosk or via an app, to
bid on a voucher for future air travel. In November 2017, United Airlines
announced that customers could select a compensation bid amount and be
placed on a list of potential volunteers willing to give up their seats. The
airline advised customers that, if needed, it would select volunteers to be
compensated starting with the lowest bidding customers.241 The advisory
highlighted ways that customers can bid for compensation to fly at a later
date.242
The academic literature on reverse auctions focuses largely, and
unsurprisingly, on procurement and marketing.243 Sandy D. Jap concentrates
on the importance of maintaining relationships in online reverse auctions in
the procurement context.244 From an efficiency perspective, Jap discusses
the ability of an online reverse auction to reduce weeks of bidding and
document processing to a process that can occur in the span of hours.245
A reverse auction is a mechanism for arriving at the lowest price buyers
are willing to pay, rather than the greatest as in a traditional auction, for a
fixed amount of goods or services. In an attempt to resist convention, Google
used a reverse auction in its initial public stock offering.246 The initial price
for a single share was set at the lowest price that all shares would be sold
following a bidding process.247
Given a reverse auction’s potential advantages, states and cities ought to
consider how such an approach may rationalize the subsidy allocation
process when attempting to influence business-location decisions.
A state or local agency could implement a reverse auction following the
legislature’s and executive’s budget allocation. The agency would issue a
public notice of available funding. There would be a deadline for companies
239. See POSNER & WEYL, supra note 42, at 50.
240. See, e.g., About the Ad Auction, supra note 42.
241. See The Hub Team, supra note 45.
242. Id.
243. See, e.g., Jap, supra note 42, at 146.
244. Id.
245. See Sandy D. Jap, Online Reverse Auctions: Issues, Themes, and Prospects for the
Future, 30 J. ACAD. MARKETING SCI. 506, 509 (2002).
246. See Sherman, supra note 43, at 629–30.
247. Id.
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to inform the agency of plans to use the subsidy and a disclosure of how much
subsidy would be needed per job, either created or retained. Upon allocating
all of the budget, the agency would award the lowest amount of subsidy per
job.
Elected representatives would still largely decide the first principles
regarding why and whether business incentives should be offered. Through
this public process, elected officials would be able to hold hearings, consider
different perspectives, and decide which metrics would be most important.
For instance, lawmakers might enact a state residency requirement for any
new jobs.248
On the other hand, lawmakers might be concerned that new jobs will go to
workers already employed, and this might cause them to leave their current
jobs in search of some other factor, such as better pay, work conditions, or
commutes. This could lead lawmakers to avoid a state residency
requirement. Whatever the particular metrics or values, having the reverse
auction design begin at the lawmaking step has the political appeal of
involving some expression of state or local values, however they are
expressed.
Also, the lawmaking process allows additional metrics and expert
perspectives to be included in the auction design process. Several metrics
are articulated in the literature about business location incentives. They
include: (1) frontloading subsidies in the early years after a business location
decision, (2) including services like job training in addition to money, (3)
making the subsidies non-refundable (i.e., the state or locality does not need
to pay out the subsidy in cash), and (4) favoring high-skilled industries over
retail.249
Assuming a legislative body decides that it is legitimate to fund business
incentives for a particular industry—perhaps health care or technology given
geographic proximity to hospitals and schools—and a set allocation of funds,
it is still necessary to examine how large companies would be able to game
the system in deciding between multiple jurisdictions. For companies
bidding in multiple jurisdictions, business incentives simply reduce taxes on
larger employers while existing businesses pay at a higher tax level.
Solutions to addressing this problem could lie in the collective agreements
discussed in Part II.B. For instance, states and cities of a certain size could
agree not to compete with each other for large employers of a certain size.
Another challenge is the competition within a jurisdiction to redistribute
economic development funds from very productive areas to less productive
ones. For example, the rise of highly successful metropolitan regions in some
cases has led to demands from areas with lower productivity for more
government funding.250 In such cases, states may work to more evenly
248. For an example of such a state residency requirement, see the case of Intel in New
Mexico. See Sams, supra note 102.
249. See infra Part III.A.5.
250. Michael Cox, The Rise of Populism and the Crisis of Globalisation: Brexit, Trump,
and Beyond, 28 IRISH STUD. INT’L AFF. 9, 9–17 (2017); Richard C. Schragger, Federalism,

2019]

LAWMAKERS AS JOB BUYERS

49

disperse capital. To make a reverse auction business-incentive scheme
politically acceptable to lawmakers from less economically productive areas,
a compensation scheme or a community benefits agreement approach could
be implemented to balance out the demands to redistribute scarce economic
development funds.
Payments to towns and landowners in exchange for accepting undesirable
land uses are not unprecedented. New York’s largest landfills, for instance,
are located in the Finger Lakes region of New York.251 Through a host of
community benefits agreements pertaining to one landfill in Seneca Falls, the
town receives 5.5 percent of the landfill’s revenue.252 Paying less developed
parts of a state in exchange for permitting a state to engage in a reverse
auction for business incentives would make such a program palatable
statewide.
3. Step Two: The Clawback Provision
Next, once all available subsidies are allocated, the agency would contract
with the successful bidders. This is where recapture mechanisms linked to a
specific number of created or retained jobs would be included in the awarded
contracts. This allows governments to claw back funds spent on companies
that accept subsidies but still reduce their workforces. Governmental subsidy
administrators may deter company flight based on particular community
economic needs.
If businesses fail to successfully do what they say they will do, the
contractual remedy will be available to claw back incentives and cancel
contracts.253 States and cities have used clawbacks effectively to recapture
incentive payments when companies do not deliver the jobs numbers that
they promise.254 In exchange for government subsidies, Intel regularly
reports its progress in hiring and retaining workers to the New Mexico
government.255 Under a clawback regime, the business must repay some of
the original incentive if it shutters or lets employees go during a specific

Metropolitanism, and the Problem of States, 105 VA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019) (manuscript
at 7), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3384084 [https://perma.cc/5YM3UCDT].
251. Steve Orr, Investigation: NYC Dumping More Garbage Than Ever in Finger Lakes
Area,
DEMOCRAT
&
CHRON.
(July
6,
2018,
1:34
PM),
https://
www.democratandchronicle.com/story/news/2018/07/06/finger-lakes-landfills-boomingmonroe-ontario-and-seneca-counties-residents-angry/754940002/ [https://perma.cc/KE99Z5AK].
252. David L. Shaw, Current Landfill Benefit Agreement Explained, FINGER LAKES TIMES
(July
24,
2016),
https://www.fltimes.com/news/current-landfill-benefit-agreementexplained/article_22aa5a44-5142-11e6-b320-7f9175b863fd.html
[https://perma.cc/NP297GNF].
253. BARTIK, supra note 14, at 83.
254. The Intel incentive project is an example of this. See, e.g., Sams, supra note 102.
255. Id.
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timeframe.256 The contract phase is an opportunity for agencies to influence
private companies through public law norms.257
4. Oversight: Role of the Public
Once contracts are in place, monitoring is primarily up to the agencies.
Agencies tasked with monitoring economic development programs face
challenges in ensuring that programs function.258 Typically, agencies that
are spread thin lack the resources for monitoring. Legislatures and
executives would need to consider the monitoring responsibilities of agencies
when allocating funds for incentive programs. The public could assist with
the monitoring process.
The intended beneficiaries of economic development incentive programs
are constituent workers who risk losing their current jobs and those who may
be hired in the future. If constituents are included in the monitoring process
through a private right of action, the monitoring agency can share the burden
of oversight. The contract drafting process can include a third-party
beneficiary provision allowing administrative challenges if the company fails
to deliver on its contractual obligations.
5. Additional Concerns: Setting Further Metrics
Beyond the two-step proposal, there are additional concerns that agencies
ought to consider when subsidizing private economic development. Once
the legislature allocates funds, the government, through the legislature or a
state or local administrative agency, sets metrics. The metrics determine how
and upon what conditions the bidding company will receive subsidies. Now,
as shown through the Washington State aerospace subsidy example and
others, the task of setting metrics for economic development is not easy.
Further, because economic development activities are not well studied, it can
be challenging to set meaningful metrics.
Currently, metrics for economic development programs focus on
somewhat obvious numbers, like the number of full-time equivalent jobs
created or retained, the investment in capital equipment or real property, and
the spending on local infrastructure. In some cases, such as Washington
State’s, the focus on keeping a particular production program failed to keep
and grow jobs due to the inclusion of robot manufacturing.259 There are
several additional metrics to consider when evaluating whether a program is
likely to be successful.
Economic data indicates that economic subsidies are most effective when
implemented in particular ways. These include: (1) when subsidies are front256. BARTIK, supra note 14, at 83.
257. See Jody Freeman, The Contracting State, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 155, 156 (2000).
258. See, e.g., PHILIP JAMES DEGNAN, OFFICE OF THE STATE COMPTROLLER, NEW JERSEY
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY: A PERFORMANCE AUDIT OF SELECTED STATE TAX
INCENTIVE PROGRAMS 9 (2019), https://nj.gov/comptroller/news/docs/eda_final_report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Z3QP-DEXE].
259. See supra note 6.
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loaded in the first couple years after a move or expansion; (2) when subsidies
are focused on certain high-skilled positions (subsidies targeting job
expansion in low-wage industries like retail tend to be less effective); (3)
when tax credits are nonrefundable and unlimited in terms of budget
allocation; and (4) when subsidies are geared towards services like
customized job training rather than cash.260 As Bartik points out, the lack of
data available to study private economic development makes disclosure
requirements in law even more critical.261
a. Front-Load Subsidies in Early Years
When designing metrics for the type of subsidy to offer a private business,
state and local agencies and legislatures should front-load the subsidy in the
first few years of a business’s relocation or expansion. The reasons for frontloading incentives are easy to understand. Businesses assign a discount rate
to future years’ incentives.262 Incentives offered in the first year, or the first
five years, are worth much more than those offered in future years.263
A bright spot is that the data indicates that, as of 2015, front-loading is
already happening.264 Moving forward, states and cities should set metrics
that focus on the incentive’s first, or first five, years. These first five years
are most important for businesses in assessing where to move or keep jobs.
Incentives offered seven to ten years into the future tend not to impact
business decision-making.265 Plus, incentives extended into the future can
be very costly to the government and public.
b. High-Skilled vs. Retail Jobs
A significant criticism of government incentives to private businesses is
that the inducements further low-wage, low-skill, part-time employment.266
Recent scholarship touts programs that place focus on career-oriented jobs in
manufacturing and other skilled sectors.267 Luckily, the data suggests that
the incentive programs of states and cities are focused more on
manufacturing and other skilled areas of work, including technology.268

260. BARTIK, supra note 14, at 117.
261. Id. at 7.
262. Id. at 83.
263. When building a new facility, for instance, a sales tax exemption on the materials and
equipment used to construct and fit out that factory is very valuable. Id. As Bartik points out,
“it seems doubtful that the property tax abatement provided in year 11 will do much to drive
business location decisions. Yet long-term property tax abatements may lead to future fiscal
problems for local schools and governments.” Id.
264. Id. at 81.
265. Id.
266. See generally MATTERA ET AL., supra note 1.
267. See, e.g., BRUCE KATZ & JEREMY NOWAK, THE NEW LOCALISM: HOW CITIES CAN
THRIVE IN THE AGE OF POPULISM 63 (2017) (highlighting the development of a robotics
industry centered around local institutions of higher education).
268. See BARTIK, supra note 14, at 6.
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There are two ways to ensure that incentives produce growth across an
economy. The first is to define the industries that can use the incentive
program.269 The second is to assign a multiplier to the jobs produced or
retained by the incentive.270
Congress specifies industries and projects through the private activity bond
program.271 This approach has given Congress tools to respond to natural
disasters and economic collapse.272 Such a response could be adopted in the
proposed bidding program and allow for legislatures to prioritize certain
projects based on responses to current needs.
Using economic multipliers seems attractive. Both the Texas and Florida
deal-closing funds require an economic multiplier of 6:1 and 5:1
respectively.273 The theory underlying this policy is that an economic
multiplier accounts for the recycling of dollars within a community.274
Simply put, it is difficult to manage this. It largely will be up to agencies
reviewing bids to ensure that the economic multiples are delivered.
c. Make Tax Subsidies Nonrefundable and
Set Caps on Amount of Incentive
Currently, many tax-incentive programs are uncapped. A related issue is
that subsidies are frequently refundable.275 Bartik observes that incentives
are refundable to businesses too frequently, meaning that the state or city has
to pay the business cash.276
For example, in the case of the Tesla Gigafactory project, Tesla receives
refundable tax credits.277 If Tesla were to apply for a tax refund, the state
would pay the credits, valued at $1.4 billion, in cash.278 This payment, which
would further deplete public coffers, would do nothing to address the
affordable housing crisis and overcrowded schools in Nevada.279 Without
eliminating the refundability of tax incentives, and setting a reasonable cap
on the total amount of subsidy, the public is not protected.
269. See id. at 117.
270. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 228.1088 (2018); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 481.078 (West
2019).
271. See generally FIPPINGER, supra note 72.
272. See MAGUIRE & HUGHES, supra note 75, at 9.
273. See FLA. STAT. § 228.1088 (2018); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 481.078 (West 2019).
274. See, e.g., Press Release, Greg Abbott, Tex. Governor, Governor Abbott Announces
New Infosys Limited Expansion in Richardson (Nov. 13, 2018), https://gov.texas.gov/
news/post/governor-abbott-announces-new-infosys-limited-expansion-in-richardson
[https://perma.cc/C8AQ-QT3Q].
275. See BARTIK, supra note 14, at 117. Specific examples discussed above include the
MEGA program in Michigan and the New York Empire Zone program, among others. See
supra notes 23, 113.
276. BARTIK, supra note 14, at 117.
277. See Tesla, Nevada Agree on Finalized Incentive Agreement, supra note 96.
278. Rory Carroll, All Humanity Has Left the Area: Paying for Tesla’s Gigafactory,
GUARDIAN (July 3, 2018, 6:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/cities/2018/jul/03/allhumanity-has-left-the-area-the-cities-paying-for-tesla-gigafactory [https://perma.cc/VGQ588PD].
279. Id.
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As a threshold matter, a bidding program imposes a cap by allocating only
a limited amount of funds. The refund matter can be addressed through
drafting the incentive program. Thus, these two issues can be addressed.
d. Include Services like Job Training in Addition to Cash
While the data is not conclusive, states spend very little on job training
programs.280 Some data suggests that services like job training can be more
cost-effective than cash incentives to businesses.281 Job training may not be
effective in addressing the displacement of existing small businesses.282
Some states like New York283 and Maine284 are taking steps to either pay for
higher education or cover the cost of student loan debt, thus easing some pain
points related to financing an education. But it is likely that more can be
done.
B. The “Publicization” of Private Economic Development
Lawmakers using legislation to increase economic development activity
do not always clearly further public goals and purposes. This creates both
challenges and opportunities.285 As Jody Freeman suggests, there are public

280. BARTIK, supra note 14, at 117.
281. See generally Harry J. Holzer et al., Are Training Subsidies for Firms Effective?: The
Michigan Experience, 46 INDUST. & LAB. REL. REV. 625 (1993); Kevin Hollenbeck, Is There
a Role for Public Support of Incumbent Worker On-the-Job Training? (Upjohn Inst., Working
Paper No. 08-138, 2008), https://research.upjohn.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1155
&context=up_workingpapers [https://perma.cc/F23D-J4BM]; William H. Hoyt et al.,
Business Incentives and Employment: What Incentives Work and Where? (Inst. for Federalism
& Intergovernmental Relations, Working Paper No. 2009-02, 2008).
282. Mayor Bloomberg and Deputy Mayor Lieber Announce New Partnerships to Provide
Advanced Auto-Related Training Programs at No Cost to Willets Point Workforce, NYC.GOV
(Nov. 1, 2008), https://www1.nyc.gov/office-of-the-mayor/news/430-08/mayor-bloombergdeputy-mayor-lieber-new-partnerships-provide-advanced-auto-related
[https://perma.cc/V2WJ-8WD5].
283. Tuition-Free Degree Program: The Excelsior Scholarship, N.Y. ST., https://
www.ny.gov/programs/tuition-free-degree-program-excelsior-scholarship [https://perma.cc/
WRR3-382K] (last visited Aug. 22, 2019).
284. The Opportunity Maine Tax Credit Reimburses Student Loan Payments for College
Graduates Who Live and Work in Maine, LIVE & WORK IN ME.,
https://www.liveandworkinmaine.com/opportunity-maine/ [https://perma.cc/4KM8-KMNP]
(last visited Aug. 22, 2019).
285. To be clear, government has a variety of mechanisms available to it to buy or create
jobs. Government can hire workers to perform a variety of tasks. Historically, this was the
course taken by the FDR administration during the Depression. See, e.g., Patrick Kline &
Enrico Moretti, Local Economic Development, Agglomeration Economies, and the Big Push:
100 Years of Evidence from the Tennessee Valley Authority, 129 Q.J. ECON. 275 (2014); A
History of Innovation, N.Y ST.: N.Y. POWER AUTHORITY, https://www.nypa.gov/about/
timeline [https://perma.cc/85W8-NW3F] (last visited Aug. 22, 2019). Government works
projects, such as the St. Lawrence-Franklin D. Roosevelt Power Project on the border of
Canada and New York State and the Wilson Dam in the Tennessee Valley were job creation
programs.
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law tools available, such as budgeting, regulating, and contracting, to bring
private actors under the frame of public law norms.286
There are several reasons for lawmakers, public policy advocates, and
legal scholars to focus on the publicization of private economic development
activity. The government’s current doctrinal and constitutional constraints
on private economic development activity are wholly inadequate to constrain
spending in this area.287 A lack of constraints on government spending for
private economic development activity is correlated with higher state and
local debt.288
Freeman identifies three factors that should be considered when deciding
on whether a function should involve publicization289: “(1) the relative
precision with which a service can be specified and the extent of the
provider’s discretion, (2) the potential impact on the consumer, and (3) the
government’s motivation for privatizion.”290 Arguments for services being
publicized are strongest where “services are highly contentious, value-laden,
and hard to specify, and when providers enjoy significant discretion; when
services affect vulnerable populations with few exit options and little
political clout; and/or when the motivation for privatization is explicitly
ideological or clearly corrupt.”291
The case for the publicization of private economic development activity is
strong. First, as demonstrated in the examples above, private economic
development activity is very difficult to specify with particularity, and
companies have sole discretion in most cases about how to develop their
businesses, including the decision to leave after receiving public funds.292
Second, workers and their families are increasingly immobile, while
companies and their capital are very mobile.293 Workers are vulnerable and,
especially in postindustrial urban and rural areas, have few job
alternatives.294 Third, political self-preservation typically motivates public
support of private economic development activity.295 This motivation alone
is suspect.

286. Jody Freeman, Extending Public Law Norms Through Privatization, 116 HARV. L.
REV. 1285, 1285 (2003).
287. See supra Part II.
288. See Libgober, supra note 32, at 5.
289. See Freeman, supra note 286, at 1291.
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. See Scott, supra note 3 (describing the Boeing tax subsidy example where the
company took significant subsidies to construct a new facility and still cut almost 17,500 jobs
in Washington State).
293. See Schragger, supra note 38, at 495.
294. Id. at 494.
295. See generally Monnat & Brown, supra note 115.
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IV. APPLYING THE TWO-STEP PROPOSAL
A. The Washington State Example Revisited
The failure of the Washington State aerospace subsidy extension was
largely because the statutory metrics focused on the development of a new
airplane wing manufacturing line.296 The number of jobs for human workers
was not included in the statute.297 Boeing could keep the tax credit because
it constructed the wing manufacturing plant.298 However, Boeing reduced
its workforce in Washington State by developing robotics and scaling back
workers on other manufacturing lines.
How would the proposed two-step bidding process address the
Washington State failure? It would do so in three ways. First, through the
budgeting process, legislators would have a public opportunity to debate the
amount of funds that should be set aside for private companies. Second,
through the setting of metrics, legislators, the executive branch, and
constituents could address the issue of maintaining jobs and not just new real
property investment. Finally, through the contracting process, the agency
charged with selection and monitoring could ensure that the company was
competitive in its incentives proposal. Through budgeting, regulation, and
contracting, public law norms could improve the incentive allocation
process.
A company as large and important as Boeing would certainly have
influence at each stage. However, the procedural bidding process would shed
light on a currently opaque subsidization process. For instance, information
about the actual benefits of the Boeing tax deal was not evident until the
company was required to report its 2015 tax savings.299 The current process
did not even set jobs targets.300 It is possible that other employers could have
made better use of the public funds—whether they be new employers from
out of state, neighboring tech employers in Seattle, or small businesses.301
There would be a public conversation about the amount of the subsidy
extended in a bidding process. The Washington State aerospace subsidy is
the largest state transfer to private industry in U.S. history.302 A bidding
process, in which other companies would have had the chance to meet or beat
Boeing’s hiring plans, would have improved an otherwise broken process.

296.
297.
298.
299.

See S. 5952, 63d Leg., 3d Spec. Sess. § 1(3) (Wash. 2013) (enacted).
Id.
See Gates, supra note 6.
Jim Brunner, For First Time, Boeing Reveals State Tax Breaks: $305 Million in 2015,
SEATTLE TIMES (Apr. 29, 2016), https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/politics/boeingsaved-305-million-last-year-from-state-tax-breaks/ [https://perma.cc/W3GK-BEGV].
300. See Wash. S. 5952 § 1(3).
301. Small businesses typically do not get the same attention and financial support from
state and local government—but they create most of the new jobs. Frequently Asked
Questions, U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN. OFF. ADVOC. (June 2016), https://www.sba.gov/
sites/default/files/advocacy/SB-FAQ-2016_WEB.pdf [https://perma.cc/NTK9-R84U].
302. See MATTERA ET AL., supra note 1, at 19.
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The agency required to oversee the economic development could share its
monitoring obligations by including a private right of action to third-party
beneficiaries. It is true that there were challenges to the Boeing subsidy, but
the challenges were not in state court and not based on the company’s failure
to meet its obligations under contract.303 As demonstrated above, court
challenges based on public purpose doctrine are unlikely to be successful.304
But a group of intended beneficiaries bringing a claim based on contract law
is another story. Individual workers, groups of workers, or unions
representing workers could have brought a contract law claim when Boeing
reduced jobs following its receipt of subsidy dollars.305
B. Florida and Texas
A bidding regime would slightly alter deal-closing funds in Florida, Texas,
and other states that have similar programs. The main change under the
bidding regime is that states like Florida and Texas would accept company
bids rather than approach the companies directly. The state legislature would
still approve an annual (or biennial) budget for the program. The governor’s
office, or monitoring agency, would still set regulation through use of
metrics. This is currently done through an enabling statute. Individual
company contracts and monitoring would continue with a few changes.
States could compare information about subsidies extended on a per job
basis. Small- and medium-sized companies could compete more easily with
larger employers when seeking government funds.
Table 1, below, compares the Washington State aerospace extension, the
Florida Quick Action Closing Fund, the Texas Enterprise Fund, and the twostep company bidding proposal.

303. The World Trade Organization (WTO) found the tax breaks illegal. Boeing Illegally
Given $5.7 Billion in Tax Breaks by Washington State, WTO Rules, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 28,
2016, 9:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-boeing-wto-20161128-story.html
[https://perma.cc/7FY2-3XSV]. However, the WTO ruling was overturned on appeal. Tim
Hepher & Tom Miles, WTO Reverses Boeing 777X Tax Credit Ruling in Blow to EU, REUTERS
(Sept. 4, 2017, 10:13 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-wto-aircraft/wto-reversesboeing-777x-tax-credit-ruling-in-blow-to-eu-idUSKCN1BF1PC
[https://perma.cc/NRD5CS8Z].
304. See generally Briffault, supra note 31.
305. In the Boeing example, machinists narrowly agreed to a new contract around the 777X
following the passage of the tax deal. See Wilson, supra note 2.
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Table 1: WA,306 FL,307 and TX308 Compared to Two-Step Company Bidding
Proposal
WA

FL

TX

Amount

$9 billion

$225.5
million

$516
million

Metrics

New facility

5:1

6:1

Target

Aerospace
sector

Companies
planning to
relocate

Companies
planning to
relocate

Two-Step
Proposal
Set by state or
local
legislature
Multiplier,
jobs, and
other metrics
Set by
legislature or
agency

Oversight

Boeing must
site aerospace
manufacturing
program in
state to keep
receiving
funds

Companies
must meet
job targets
to keep
receiving
funds

Companies
must meet
job targets
to keep
receiving
funds

Company
reporting and
subject to
claw back if
jobs targets
not met

C. Capture, Gaming, and Other Arguments Against the Proposal
Any administrative process is subject to capture by regulators, especially
one involving public spending for private business development. Of course,
companies will make efforts to game the system by using metrics to win bids.
There are a number of ways to guard against this.
The two-step bid proposal itself works to break down the capture process:
if companies are not made offers by the government but are instead required
to bid, then the process will likely be more efficient from the start.
Companies seeking to bid can also influence the metric setting, or regulation,
and the contracting parts of the process. However, there are checks
throughout the bidding process with public processes at each step, public
norms of accountability, transparency, and rationality, as well as the principle
of due process.
Certain requirements ought to limit gaming, which would lower its
likelihood. For instance, a company must demonstrate that it is considering
a location in another jurisdiction to bid on the available funds.
Another way to address the issue of gaming is through blind bidding. By
blind bidding, companies would bid for the least amount of government
306. See S. 5952, 63d Leg., 3d Spec. Sess. (Wash. 2013) (enacted). See generally
MATTERA ET AL., supra note 1.
307. See FLA. STAT. § 288.1088 (2018); Dixon, supra note 111.
308. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 481.078 (West 2019); Texas Enterprise Fund (TEF) as
of June 30, 2019, TEX. ECON. DEV., https://gov.texas.gov/uploads/files/business/
TEF_Listing_as_of_6.30.19.pdf [https://perma.cc/X58J-58GV] (last visited Aug. 22, 2019).
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subsidy per job without disclosing the company name.309 Such a program
embraces what Mariana Mazzucato has described as government support for
business; the state stepping in with needed investment the private sector will
not provide.310 While some large employers might make themselves known
by certain types of proposals, as is likely with any public process, all
qualifying projects could be entered into a lottery and selected at random.
It is unlikely that this process would entirely eliminate public outrage
towards employers that accept subsidies and then leave. However, a bidding
mechanism with an opportunity to address recapture of a subsidy for
company nonperformance affords a clear opportunity for the government and
community to address outrage around employers fleeing after receiving
subsidies.
There is a chance that critics still will cry foul about a process involving
government agencies where the names of bidders are disclosed. Two
solutions to this problem stick out: first, names of bidders could be sealed;
and second, once eligible bids are assessed, subsidies could be allocated at
random based on funds available.
D. Federal Reforms, Next Steps
The focus of some reform suggestions center on efforts at the federal
level.311 While they are important, and certainly could go a long way to
improving the efforts states and cities make to encourage local private
economic development, they are outside the scope of this Article.
Furthermore, if anything, the floodgates are wide open for federal-level
regulation. With the Treasury’s recent proposed regulations of the
Opportunity Zone program,312 investors will be able to avoid capital gains
on real estate invested for at least ten years in a specific area.313 Maps of the
Opportunity Zones have already been drawn.314 One report has suggested
309. By analogy the process would work like a company’s initial public offering. See
Sherman, supra note 43, at 629–30.
310. Mariana Mazzucato, The Innovative State: Governments Should Make Markets, Not
Just Fix Them, FOREIGN AFF., Jan./Feb. 2015, at 61, 61.
311. Bipartisan efforts already have been made to curb the rampant subsidization of sports
and entertainment stadiums and arenas through tax-exempt bond financing. See, e.g., Press
Release, Cory Booker, U.S. Senator, Booker, Lankford Introduce Bipartisan Bill to End
Federal Subsidies for Sports Stadiums (June 13, 2017), https://www.booker.senate.gov/
?p=press_release&id=612 [https://perma.cc/8GY4-AHK7]. Previously, the White House had
zeroed out the budget for public financing for sports and entertainment facilities in the 2017
budget. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, GENERAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATION’S FISCAL
YEAR 2017 REVENUE PROPOSALS 83 (2016), https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/taxpolicy/Documents/General-Explanations-FY2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/S4HV-BMYJ].
312. Investing in Qualified Opportunity Funds, 83 Fed. Reg. 54,279 (proposed Oct. 29,
2018) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1).
313. Micah W. Bloomfield et al., Stroock’s Take on the New ‘Qualified Opportunity Zone’
Guidance, STROOCK (Oct. 19, 2018), https://www.stroock.com/publications/stroocks-take-onthe-new-qualified-opportunity-zone-guidance [https://perma.cc/D6JT-8XS2].
314. CDFI FUND, https://www.cims.cdfifund.gov/preparation/?config=config_nmtc.xml
[https://perma.cc/DRH8-8CJE] (last visited Aug. 22, 2019) (showing a national map of the
qualified opportunity zone borders).
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that the Treasury do the following to implement the Opportunity Zone tax
credits appropriately, including: (1) target the right places using better data;
(2) use appropriate financing, monitoring compliance, and mandating
transparency; (3) guard against federal subsidy abuse; and (4) evaluate the
program to ensure it achieves its goals.315
The author remains skeptical about the likelihood that state or federal
courts will reinterpret the substance of the public purpose doctrine or the state
constitutional prohibitions on gifts, loans, or extension of the government’s
credit for private business.316 The Supreme Court took steps to further the
public’s understanding of what constitutes “public use,”317 which is related
to public purpose. Whether or not that will shift with the reconfiguration of
the Court to a solid five conservative vote majority remains to be seen.
Were courts to adopt a more robust analysis of what constitutes a public
purpose, there are some guides. There are a number of factors that courts can
use to assess whether a project fits within a public purpose: (1) safety
precautions of the project; (2) waste disposal plans; (3) traffic; (4) burden of
increased population on existing government services; (5) availability of
housing; and (6) psychological tensions caused by the project.318 With the
possible exception of the sixth factor, most of these factors certainly fit within
a specific analysis that a court could engage in at a fact-finding stage to assess
whether a public purpose exists. The difficulty, however, is perhaps in
courts’ reluctance to legislate. Courts tend to defer to legislatures, especially
on social laws.319 In other words, courts rely on the legislative check to curb
such oversubsidization.
In a related area, courts are reluctant to overturn state and local government
efforts to regulate development because of gentrification claims. One recent
opinion on this topic, issued by a court in New York State, highlights this
issue. In Ordonez v. City of New York,320 a state court judge combined two
separate challenges to zoning approvals brought by longtime residents of rent
regulated housing in East Harlem and Brooklyn.321 In both instances,
residents challenged the city’s analysis of the socioeconomic impact of
zoning approvals on longtime, low-income renters.322 In each case, city

315. HILARY GELFOND & ADAM LOONEY, BROOKINGS INST., LEARNING FROM OPPORTUNITY
ZONES: HOW TO IMPROVE PLACE-BASED POLICIES 1 (2018), https://www.brookings.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2018/10/Looney_Opportunity-Zones_final.pdf
[https://perma.cc/DNM9Y4AV].
316. See supra Part II.A.
317. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 494 (2005) (O’Connor, J., dissenting)
(“Under the banner of economic development, all private property is now vulnerable to being
taken and transferred to another private owner, so long as it might be upgraded—i.e., given to
an owner who will use it in a way that the legislature deems more beneficial to the public—in
the process.”).
318. Comment, supra note 33, at 802.
319. See, e.g., Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954).
320. No. 450100/2018, 2018 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2911 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. July 11, 2018).
321. See generally id.
322. Id. at *13.
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officials followed environmental assessments guidelines in analyzing how
zoning decisions would impact the various areas.323
Since the city followed the guidelines, the court would not overturn the
city’s final approval of each zoning application based on claims that new
development would have significant harms on longtime residents.324 Such a
decision reveals the challenges that gentrification places on residents and the
reality that state courts are likely to uphold state and local government
agencies’ decisions.
CONCLUSION
Courts and lawmakers have much to grapple with in constraining
government support for private economic development activity. Studies
demonstrate that the public purpose doctrine and state constitutional
prohibitions are wholly inadequate at limiting the ability of state and local
legislators to buy jobs for their constituents. This Article proposes an
auction-based approach to rationalize the job-generation process.
Under this Article’s proposed two-step auction process, disruptions to
communities are likely. Few legal remedies are available to longtime
residents at risk of displacement. But as areas grow and develop, there are
perhaps opportunities for middle class families to return to areas, like urban
cores, that they have fled. And revitalized job opportunities may allow poor
families—especially in African American communities—to move into the
middle class.
In light of this Article’s discussion about state and local officials spending
public funds to retain and attract employment, one wonders about the future
of work and the government’s role in transferring funds to workers. There
are issues related to how governments ensure that workers have money to
consume while also ensuring a healthy, dignified, and productive society. In
engaging in job buying, lawmakers have adopted a supply-side, neoliberal
belief that it is better to spend public funds to attempt to attract high paying
jobs than to use public resources to expand direct payments to workers
through social or economic programs.
More fundamentally, there is the question of what types of jobs
governments can attract and how private sector employment will develop. A
shift to a service-based economy and the robotization of certain
manufacturing or dangerous work will continue to mean that the work that
families relied on for generations will no longer exist. Workers must
confront that reality. Governments already deal with displaced factories, the
closure of which eliminates property tax, sales tax, and income tax revenue.
Additional direct and indirect economic benefits occur through the injection
of payroll into a local economy and the multiplier effect that occurs when
workers eat at restaurants, shop at grocery stores, buy or rent homes, and
consume local goods and services.
323. Id. at *12.
324. Id. at *79.
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The public policy imperative for lawmakers to buy jobs is unlikely to
change. The force and power of constituents’ need for work and income is
so strong. Because it is unlikely that spending on private economic
development will subside on its own, a legal constraint is necessary to check
lawmakers. Because it has proven too difficult to substantively constrain
spending, a procedural check is the more obvious solution. This Article has
presented a two-step proposal. The first step involves a reverse-auction
process to ensure the least amount of public subsidy is used per job. The
second step is a clawback provision that allows the public to recapture
subsidies should agreed-upon job targets not be achieved.
Some observers may argue that an auction approach unnecessarily
complicates a simple negotiation process for businesses and governments to
reach agreement on subsidy terms. A bid process, some may think, could
chill private sector participation in job creation through new commercial real
estate development. Even simpler, a jurisdiction that adopts such a process
could drive businesses across city or state lines into an area with fewer
regulations.
This criticism is certainly a fair one to consider. Government is frequently
characterized—often deservedly—for moving too slow for the pace of
business. However, in the reverse-auction scenario posed by this Article, the
idea is to accomplish the dual goals of government inducing businesses to
hire workers, grow operations, and spend money on office and plant
facilities, while also checking potential overspending of scarce public funds.
A related criticism is that the possible programs legislated in the reverseauction process could limit innovation. If the goal is to get companies to
increase their innovativeness, having the strictures of government-imposed
metrics could be too limiting. In the Boeing example, perhaps developing
robot technology for airplane wing or fuselage manufacturing actually
improves the process. A reformed, more restrictive bidding process could
unnecessarily limit companies’ ability to develop new manufacturing
techniques and processes.
The answer likely lies somewhere in between. Lawmakers must consider
what the government’s role is in developing industry such that constituent
employment remains fruitful and robust. Exploring the values involved in
work—both financial and, in some cases, moral—ought to occur through
debate among elected representatives. Courts likely are better left to
determine the satisfactory compliance with procedural requirements than in
making substantive decisions about how and when lawmakers can use public
money to buy jobs.

